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Appraising Employment and Training Research
A Policy Statement
of the
National Council on Employment Policy
April 1984
The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962
(MDTA) began a new era for labor market-related research
by authorizing specific sums of federal money for research
on the nation's employment and training problems. The
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act continued
that practice, and the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982
(JTPA) declares that the goal of the act is:
Sec. 221. (a) To assist the Nation in expanding
work opportunities and assuring access to those op
portunities for all who desire it, the Secretary shall
establish a comprehensive program of employment
and training research utilizing the methods, tech
niques, and knowledge of the behavioral and social
sciences and such other methods, techniques, and
knowledge as will aid in the solution of the
Nation's employment and training problems.
The use of the limited research and development (R&D)
funds has been carefully planned and monitored, and the
returns in policy improvement have been impressive. Never
theless, this long-standing, high-payoff program, which is
administered by the Department of Labor's Employment
and Training Administration (ETA), appears about to be
sacrificed on the altar of misplaced economy. Hence, it
seems timely to review the nature and results of the program
and identify those components especially worthy of saving.

Illustrative Contributions of ETA's
Research, Development, and Evaluation Program
ETA's research, demonstration, and evaluation (RD&E)
program played an important role in changing the direction
of the MDTA shortly after it was passed. The original
legislation was enacted in response to the belief that automa
tion was the major cause of unemployment during the 1960s.
The Act directed the Department of Labor to provide train
ing and retraining to persons with fairly strong attachments
to the labor force whose skills had become obsolete as a
result of technological changes.
Some of the earliest research supported under the MDTA
suggested that automation was playing only a limited role in
explaining the extent and nature of unemployment during
the mid-1960s. The researchers clarified the problem of
unemployment by directing the attention of policymakers to
the growing number of disadvantaged workers who were
jobless (i.e., minorities, women, youth, the uneducated and
unskilled) and needed training and retraining to become
employable. Those findings contributed to a redirection of
policy, which has prevailed to this day. The finding that
training applicants could not be successfully trained by ex
isting methods because they could not read or write led to the
addition of basic literacy courses to the program. When
research showed that training programs were being inun
dated with inexperienced, jobless young school dropouts
who were not eligible for training—the first wave of the baby
boom—the rules were changed to enlarge the youth compo
nent. When other findings suggested that a high program
dropout rate was related to inadequate stipends because
many trainees could not afford to remain in programs,
amendments were passed to augment those allowances.
Even as the emphasis changed to the disadvantaged,
policymakers failed to realize that those services alone might
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not solve deep-rooted and pervasive problems, such as
discrimination, the inability to read or write, inadequate
labor market information, poor motivation, and insufficient
market demand. The complexity of the social and economic
problems faced by unemployed workers was brought to the
attention of policymakers and the general public by the
research, experimental and development program.
The findings of the RD&E program suggested that the
assignment given to federal agencies to move unemployed
workers into jobs was far more difficult to achieve than had
been assumed in the early 1960s.
Social scientists supported under ETA's research program
gave early warnings during the 1960s and the 1970s that pro
found changes were taking place in society that would affect
women's participation in the labor force. They identified the
growing divorce and separation rates, the increase in infants
born to women without husbands, and the women's libera
tion movement as significant factors that would increase the
number of women heading families who would be entering
the labor force. Again, the research results were utilized for
policy purposes, as reflected in new amendments to employ
ment and training legislation and the design of new training
programs for women who head families.
The labor market problems faced by minority workers
were given special attention under ETA's social science
research program. One significant study documented
discriminatory practices that prevented minority enrollment
in apprenticeship programs. The study also found that
because minority youths have no relatives or other adult
models in the skilled trades, they know very little about the
apprenticeship system and how to enter it. In response, ETA
funded an action-oriented organization to assist minority
workers in learning about the apprenticeship system and
prepare them for apprenticeship examinations. These efforts
Vll

generated by the research are largely responsible for tripling
the proportion of minority workers in apprenticeship pro
grams between 1967 and 1980.
Long term support was provided to Columbia University's
Conservation of Human Resources. The Columbia resear
chers were among the first to identify the role of government
and other nonprofit institutions in economic growth. They
also examined the impacts of the growing service-oriented
sector and the effect of employers' policies on the employ
ment experience of noncollege-trained young workers. A
series of studies of the health industry correctly anticipated
the rapid employment growth in the health field; these find
ings were used by program operators in selecting growth oc
cupations for government-sponsored training of
unemployed workers. Several examinations conducted by
the Columbia group of the experience of other countries in
dealing with training disadvantaged workers also helped to
shape U.S. legislation and policies during the 1970s.
Early on, it became clear that progress in labor market
research was being hampered by the lack of qualified re
searchers interested in the field. To develop research
capabilities, ETA provided research support for over 500
doctoral candidates between 1962 and 1980 to induce young
scholars to devote their talents to the study of employment
and training problems. A conscious effort was made to bring
new interdisciplinary skills into a field that had previously
been limited largely to labor economists. The conclusions of
many researchers funded by ETA indicated that employment
and training problems transcended economics. Many of the
scholars supported under this program are now employed in
universities, private industry, foundations, government, and
research organizations.
Mindful of the operational responsibilities, the managers
of the RD&E program did not shrink from the independent
Vlll

evaluation of the agency's activities. They funded
assessments of the Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC), the
Job Corps, and the Employment Service. An intragency
committee consisting of departmental program officials and
the research office developed research objectives for improv
ing the services provided by the Labor Department. Research
findings from these projects led to the creation of new NYC
delivery models for rural youth and an employment service
that was more responsive to the needs of the country's disadvantaged workers.
Research also saved money. The RD&E office helped
design experimental and developmental models to pretest
programs before they were introduced as large scale social
programs. Coaching, outreach, and job development efforts
had their origins in experimental and developmental pro
jects. The experimental tests also prevented policymakers
from embarking on impractical training approaches.
ETA research administrators were often able to persuade
other federal agencies to underwrite experimental and
demonstration projects. An example is the Supported Work
project, which was cofunded by the National Institute on
Drug Abuse, the Department of Justice, the Department of
Health and Human Services and the Ford Foundation. This
demonstration research project, which served 10,000 par
ticipants, was designed to develop a work alternative to
welfare for persons often considered unemployable because
of their antisocial behavioral patterns. Ex-offenders, exaddicts, welfare heads of household, and unemployed, outof-school youth were provided with work experiences for
about a year, under close supervision and in a work situation
associated with a crew of peers.
The Supported Work project indicated that diverse ser
vices were most effective in preparing women who had been
long term welfare recipients for the world of work. The serIX

vices also had an impact on a significant segment of the exaddict population, but little effect on ex-offenders and the
youth group. Although the major findings of the project
have not been applied on a larger scale because of reduced
federal funding for employment and training programs,
several cities have adopted the model, and social service
agencies have implemented projects for mentally retarded
youth based on the findings of the Supported Work project.
In addition to mission- and problem-oriented research, the
administrators of ETA's research program recognized that
some social research requires a long term investment to il
luminate complex economic and social developments.
Therefore, in response to limitations of cross-sectional data
that provide a snapshot of how workers fare in labor
markets, ETA launched the National Longitudinal Survey
(NLS) of labor market experience. Data were collected on
the employment, unemployment, mobility, and other labor
market experiences of a national sample of youth, middleaged, and preretirement mature workers at various critical
stages of their working lives. The NLS has provided insights
into how, when, and why socioeconomic problems arise and
has given scholars and policymakers important tools for
determining future labor market decisions of workers. In
1979 a new cohort project was started which focused on
disadvantaged youths and provided a follow-up of young
persons who entered the armed forces.
The NLS is probably the most important data set that has
ever been collected about American workers. The research
findings have had important impacts on policy decisions and
have affected the design of employment and training pro
grams. For example, the NLS shows that lack of vocational
guidance and vocational information handicaps young
blacks in their job search efforts. NLS findings have
repeatedly documented the effect of sex and race discrimina
tion on women and minority workers. The data have shown

that mature black women who are heads of one-parent
families are among the most disadvantaged persons in our
society. Hundreds of scholars have also used the unique in
formation base of the NLS in studying the movement of
workers into and out of the labor market.
The trend toward early retirement is confirmed by the
NLS. The data indicate that, contrary to popular belief, the
majority of men retire voluntarily, and only a small propor
tion are forced out of their jobs because of mandatory retire
ment; more than a third retire because of poor health. If
funding continues, the NLS data will eventually be the na
tion's most significant source of information about mature
working women as they approach retirement age.
Many of the NLS findings suggest that conventional
employment and training approaches have not taken into ac
count that many labor market disadvantages appear to
originate in a long term developmental process that begins in
the home. Values, attitudes toward work, family respon
sibilities, parental models, divorces and separations, sex role
norms, age of marriage, and education and income of
parents all seem to affect future labor market experiences. If
the information from the NLS were applied, our human
resource policies would call for training programs that place
greater emphasis on preventing labor market disadvantages
from developing at an early stage in an individual's life.

Managing the RD&E Program
In conducting a pioneering federal social science research
program, the administrators of ETA had to design a pro
curement system that was equitable to those seeking research
support, attract the most qualified personnel, and develop a
staff capable of initiating, processing, and monitoring pro
jects that could help ETA achieve its objectives. To comple
ment those goals, the RD&E office encouraged the submisxi

sion of unsolicited proposals, but it also initiated a com
petitive request for proposals (RFP). Originally, owing to
funding limitations, greater reliance was placed on un
solicited proposals that came primarily from the academic
community. When the RD&E budget was increased, ex
perimental and demonstration projects were undertaken and
more use was made of RFPs, which elicited proposals from
entrepreneurial or consulting organizations.
An effort was made to maintain a balance between un
solicited proposals and RFPs in order to attract academically
based scholars, who were more likely to question the
premises on which programs and practices were based, and
specialists employed in consulting firms who could apply
their operational knowledge to experimental and develop
ment projects. Departmental staff, specialists employed in
other federal agencies, and outside experts reviewed and
assessed the proposals.
ETA offered academicians temporary fellowships to work
in RD&E. These academicians became a valuable resource
when they returned to their universities. Many of them con
tributed to policy-oriented research and assisted in for
mulating research issues and evaluating RD&E projects.
Dissemination and Utilization
of Research Findings
Censorship is a recurrent problem in federal agencies that
sponsor social science research. Findings of research or ex
perimental and development projects often question conven
tional wisdom or challenge the effectiveness of programs.
Agency administrators often are not interested in publishing
information that may be critical of programs they originated
or manage.
Administrators of RD&E programs have had to protect
the right of researchers to freely express conclusions based
xii

on their studies. They also play an important role in pro
viding communication links between the research communi
ty and the potential users of research findings. ETA has
published and disseminated research reports that were used
in the policymaking process. A conscientious effort was
made to translate the jargon of some social scientists so that
research findings could be understood and used by a wide
audience of policymakers and the general public.

Threats to Employment and Training Research
Over the past two decades, the National Council on
Employment Policy has carefully assessed the RD&E pro
grams that have been conducted by the Department of
Labor's Employment and Training Administration. The
Council has concluded that the products of ETA's social
science research programs have played an important role in
shaping and formulating national policy on employment and
training issues.
We are therefore deeply concerned that the program is
now facing the most devastating threats in its 20 years of
productive existence. Funding has been cut from a modest
1980 level of $13.0 million to only $6.1 million for 1984. An
excessive reliance on formal RFPs may encourage research
that represents the preconceptions of politically appointed
administrators, precluding innovative proposals based on
the insights of objective observers. The doctoral dissertation
program has been cancelled, cutting off the flow of new
researchers. Policymakers and the general public of the midand late-1980s will not have access to the information needed
to assess the effectiveness of the Job Training Partnership
Act; such information can only be gleaned from the findings
of academic-based researchers and the experts employed in
consulting firms.
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The recent discontinuance of the ETA Office of Research
and Development's utilization and dissemination activities
has created a serious vacuum in the knowledge base about
the new direction of policy on employment and training
issues.
The situation is not limited to the Department of Labor.
During the 1980-1984 period, when outlays for total research
rose by more than 40 percent, expenditures for the social
sciences were curtailed by about 18 percent. Although
federal outlays for all social programs have been increasing
rapidly, only 3 percent, or $432 million, was allocated to
social science research in 1984. 1 The funding for social
research is small in comparison with the cost of supporting
the hard sciences and miniscule compared to the cost of
operating the government's social programs. The federal
government can only assure the nation that it is making a
wise investment in social programs if it provides support for
a social science research that is commensurate with operating
programs.
Policy Recommendations
1. Federal support for ETA's RD&E programs should be

r r\j»nHpH nnt
decreased.
not HprrpncpH
expanded,

The new Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA) is ex
perimenting with a new and relatively untested delivery
system that places greater emphasis on private-sector in
itiatives and cooperation in delivering services to
economically disadvantaged and displaced workers. The ad
ministrators of the JTPA, Congress, and the public need
1. Federal support for the social sciences is largely centered in four agencies that provide
almost three-fourths of these funds. The 1984 obligations of these agencies were as follows:
the Department of Health and Human Services, $142.4 million; the Department of
Agriculture, $92.5 million; the Department of Education, $38.4 million; and the National
Science Foundation, $34.8 million.
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reliable and objective information about this new delivery
system. Increased support should be given to social science
research and small-scale experimental and development pro
jects so that their findings can help in assessing the effec
tiveness of the JTPA. The research products of carefully
designed experimental projects should raise the level of
debate about the usefulness and contributions of employ
ment, training, and other social welfare programs.
2. The National Longitudinal Survey (NLS), a basic na
tional data source that supplies the country with unique in
formation about the labor market experience of our
workforce, should be given full and continuous funding.
Longitudinal surveys cannot be subject to inconsistent, in
termittent, and inadequate appropriations. Respondents will
be lost and the immediacy of the data will not be maintained
if long term and sustained funding is not provided.
3. ETA's doctoral dissertation program should be revived
and maintained.
The dissertation program has made a major contribution
to human resource development by enabling hundreds of
young scholars to be trained for work in the field of employ
ment and training. Most of these young professionals have
maintained their interest in programs designed to train or
retrain economically disadvantaged workers. ETA's relative
ly small investment in the dissertation program has had a
lasting effect on the supply of social researchers from dif
ferent social science disciplines.
4. The dissemination and utilization of RD&E findings
based on studies of employment and training programs
should be continued and encouraged.
Dissemination and unlimited access to the findings of
government-sponsored social research reflect intellectual
freedom in a society dedicated to democratic principles.
XV

ETA should revive its dissemination and utilization program
so that its RD&E findings will enable policymakers in the ex
ecutive branch and Congress, as well as the general public, to
make informed decisions about employment and training
programs.
The acquisition of information about social and economic
problems must be a public concern in a democracy. Govern
ments cannot be effective and responsive without knowledge
generated by social science research. The findings of social
research can illuminate the complex issues facing our society
and assist in avoiding some of the consequences of our major
economic and social problems.

XVI

FOREWORD
In reflecting on the 1960s and 1970s, many researchers
have acknowledged the truly dramatic and substantive
changes that occurred in American society in regard to the
role and status of minorities, women and the disadvantaged.
It is not an exaggeration to conclude that the changes con
stituted a social revolution that has greatly enhanced the
American dream of recognizing the dignity and worth of
every human being. Central to this set of changes was the
recognition that access to the American dream was gained
largely through jobs and income as deprived individuals
gained the required training and work opportunities.
The federal legislative initiatives of the 1960s included a
requirement that research explore in greater depth the prob
lems being addressed and that evaluation be made of the new
programs in employment and training. Program demonstra
tions and experiments were a natural addition to re
quirements for research and evaluation. Thus, research,
demonstration, and evaluation became integral tools for
designing new social policy.
The focus of these proceedings is limited to a review of the
programs conducted by the Office of Policy, Evaluation and
Research in the Department of Labor's Employment and
Training Administration. The National Council on Employ
ment Policy, at its January 1984 meetings, devoted the better
part of two days to reviewing the past, examining present
policy, and developing modest recommendations for present
and future policy. The policy statement reflects the thoughts
and conclusions of the Council on the contributions of 20
years of research, demonstration, and evaluation efforts of
the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S.
Department of Labor.
XVll

To aid in its review, the Council commissioned four
papers by persons who have played central roles in the
development and management of the research, demonstra
tion, and evaluation programs. The reflections of Dr. Eli
Ginzberg are especially instructive because of his dual role as
researcher and adviser to Presidents, Secretaries of Labor,
and the Congress over a period of more than three decades.
Dr. Ginzberg's paper is a model for all activist scholars who
venture to bridge the two worlds of academic scholarship
and public policy activism. Dr. Ginzberg examines the
research, demonstration, and evaluation contributions to ex
panding and improving (a) the number and quality of re
searchers, (b) the data base, and (c) the methodology of
research. His central conclusion is that the program was
"highly successful" despite the limitations of the academic
environment on which it depended for success.
A review of the 20-year period would also be incomplete
without a contribution from Dr. Howard Rosen, who was
the central figure within the Department of Labor in shaping
and managing the research, demonstration, and evaluation
program. He argues that the development of a successful
research, demonstration, and evaluation program is possible
within a mission-oriented agency only if it is able to
demonstrate the usefulness of its findings. He further
documents his view that, even with modest resources, it is
possible to have a major impact upon the interests and work
of the social science research community. He also claims that
significant policy changes were made in laws, regulations,
and the management of programs as a result of the more
than 2,000 studies completed with research, demonstration,
and evaluation funding.
A paper by Dr. Gary Burtless and Dr. Robert H.
Haveman summarizes the lessons learned from three major
labor market experimentation programs conducted in the
United States. The Seattle-Denver income maintenance exXVlll

periment tested the impact of a negative income tax plan on
the labor market activity of some 4,800 families over a
period of three to five years. The National Supported Work
Program was designed to provide one year of work ex
perience to persons with severe employment problems. The
Employment Opportunity Pilot Project was a guaranteed
jobs program to be tested at 14 sites throughout the United
States. The authors conclude that while much was learned
from the three programs, such experiments may not be the
way to demonstrate the usefulness of basic policy proposals.
In the final paper in this volume, Dr. Daniel Saks suggests
a research agenda for employment and training policy in the
1980s. He notes the recent decline in funding for research
and focuses attention on issues regarding the organization
and administration of a research program.
Collectively these papers and the policy statement provide
a much needed review of what has gone on over the past 20
years in employment and training research. It is hoped that
the volume will stimulate and encourage research,
demonstration, and program evaluation efforts in the
future. For some observers of the current scene, the success
of the social revolution of the 1960s and 1970s in expanding
employment opportunities for minorities, women, and the
disadvantaged is by no means complete. While research,
demonstration, and evaluation have made an enormous con
tribution to knowledge and policy, the task, the challenge,
and the opportunity continue even though federal financial
support is dwindling to the point where the existence of a
meaningful program is in doubt.

R. Thayne Robson, Chairman
National Council on Employment Policy
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Expanding the Knowledge
Base for Informed
Public Policy
The U.S. Department of Labor's
Research Program 1963-1978*

Eli Ginzberg
1. Introduction
When asked to take on this assignment, I immediately
responded in the affirmative since my colleagues and I at the
Conservation of Human Resources (CHR), Columbia
University, have been major beneficiaries of DOL funding
throughout the two decades. Clearly our beneficiary status
necessitates that this special relationship be acknowledged,
but it did not justify my turning down the invitation. Except
for the most recent generation of manpower researchers, all
who have worked in the field of human resources and man
power had been beneficiaries of DOL, some more, some less.

*Anna Dutka, a long-time member of the Conservation staff who has assisted me on many
earlier projects, was most helpful on the present assignment. She found many of the critical
items that I have reviewed; she checked a great many details with informed persons inside
and outside of the federal government; she made sure that text and footnotes were aligned;
and she took over responsibility of turning my draft manuscript into final product. For all
of this assistance, and more, I am deeply in her debt.
1
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My solution to this conflict of interest is relatively simple:
I will not deal with the multiple research products that the
Conservation of Human Resources produced beyond calling
the reader's attention to the brief descriptive summary that
can be found in Research and Development: A 16-Year
Compendium (1963-78) (hereinafter cited as Compendium);
The Conservation of Human Resources Project: Fortieth
Anniversary Report, Columbia University, March 1979; and
a listing and brief notation of the principal CHR research
supported by DOL appended to this paper.
Let me further note that because of various governmental
and nongovernmental positions, I had other interlocking
relationships with the Department of Labor's Office of
Research and Development (ORD), in particular, as Chair
man, National Commission for Employment Policy and as
Chairman of the Board, Manpower Demonstration and
Research Corporation.
The above helps to make the record clear. But I should
also add that I have had a long and close friendship with
Howard Rosen, the long term director of ORD.

2. Orientation
The above potential sources of conflicts of interest having
been specified, it is desirable, if not essential, that I touch at
least briefly on a number of intellectual and emotional
predispositions that have long helped to shape my thinking
about research in human resources and manpower as well as
in the broader arena of social investigations.
As a pupil of Wesley Clair Mitchell and John Maurice
Clark, I come out of the "institutional school of economics"
with deep skepticism about the applicability of mainline
economics as an explanatory theory of the U.S. and world
economies. My skepticism has been that much greater when
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it comes to applying neoclassical economics to the analysis of
human resources and the labor market. 1
Further, I am in fundamental disagreement with the
positivistic tradition of the Chicago School, which believes
that economics is a "value-free" discipline and that the
results of the researcher are totally independent of his
political orientation. Aristotle taught that man is a political
animal. Hence he can engage in value-free social inquiries
only if he were able to think and reflect outside of his own
skin. But I cannot conceive of such a disembodied re
searcher. 2
Let me call attention to a few more preconceptions and
prejudices. While money, especially large amounts of
money, can, over a period of years, alter a research environ
ment by increasing the number of trained researchers, a
significant transformation requires considerable time. Even
when successful, as in the case of biomedical research which
saw federal expenditures increase from about $65 million in
1950 to about $4 billion in 1984, the much enlarged research
establishment may make very slow progress in solving com
plex problems such as understanding the causative factors in
cancer.
Further, the institutional reinforcement that established
doctrines and techniques receive from the academic leader
ship does not yield ground readily—not even in the presence
of new, large, and sustained research and development ex
penditures. The reasons are not difficult to appreciate: most
good researchers are interested in an academic career and
have the best prospects of success if they conform at least to
the extent where their seniors and peers publish their articles
and vote to grant them tenure.
Reformulated, the foregoing implies that a federal
research and development program is inevitably and to a
large degree the captive of the academic establishment.

4 Expanding the Knowledge Base

Many will say this is as it should be; but moral imperatives
aside, this is how it has been and will probably long continue
to be.
Federal research funds are made available by Congress
with the Administration playing a leading or, at a minimum,
a supporting role. Hence there is no possible way for a
federal research and development program to get under way
and flourish unless those concerned with its growth and wellbeing keep, at all times, not one but two ears to the ground.
Skillful research administrators must make a large number
of compromises on both the administrative and the
legislative fronts if a continuing dollar flow is to be secured.
They are most successful if they know where they want to go
and succeed in moving ahead with only an occasional detour.
Finally, one must recognize that the most important ad
vances in the natural and the social sciences are the work of
men of genius. 3 By definition, not even the best planned,
financed and executed research and development program
has learned how to increase the number of geniuses. All that
it can accomplish is to improve the methods, the data, the
personnel and the environment which may sooner or later
lead to a major breakthrough that will advance the
discipline.

3. Criteria and Overview
The results of an assessment of a research and develop
ment program depend on the criteria employed. If the
criterion is a major intellectual breakthrough, the odds are
overwhelming, for the reasons just adumbrated, that the
evaluation will be negative.
What other, more reasonable criteria, might be used to
assess a research and development program? Three have
already been alluded to in passing: the enlargement of the

Expanding the Knowledge Base 5

research pool, the improvement in the data base, and the
development of new, as well as the reinforcement of existing,
methodologies. In the assessment that follows, we will start
by making use of each of these three criteria.
One can begin this assessment by noting that ORD,
through its dissertational grant program,4 enlarged the pool
of young researchers by an order of magnitude. During the
16-year period under review, it added almost 500 new doc
torates to the pool.
A second major accomplishment of ORD was its signifi
cant strengthening of the data base. Most of the 2000 or so
grants and contracts which it funded yielded some new data
about some facet or facets of the labor market. But ORD
made its largest single commitment, beginning in 1965, to
improve the data base by funding the National Longitudinal
Surveys at Ohio State.
On the third front, the development of new methodology,
ORD moved circumspectly. It was cognizant of a division of
labor between itself and the National Science Foundation,
whose charter gave the latter more scope to support research
aimed at the development and refinement of theories and
techniques. On the other hand, Congress encouraged ORD
to undertake evaluative studies of manpower programs and
in the process considerable advances in evaluation techni
ques were achieved. One must add, however, that many
evaluations contributed little if anything to improved results,
substantive or methodological.
The single most useful volume that deals with the ORD
program is a collection of papers contributed by Ray Mar
shall, Denis Johnston, Michael Piore, Glen Cain, Peter
Barth, Vernon Briggs and Herbert Parnes under the editor
ship of Gordon Swanson and Jon Michaelson. 5 These papers
were prepared for the Committee on Department of Labor
Manpower Research and Development of the National
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Academy of Science, chaired by Gordon Swanson, that had
undertaken a review of the ORD program and published its
report in the mid-1970s under the title Knowledge and Policy
in Manpower. 6
Peter Earth, in his contributed paper, calls attention to
several ways in which a review of research can be approach
ed: concentration on the subject areas that have received at
tention; assessment of the quality of the research; determina
tion of the existence of patterns; evaluation of the timeliness
of the research and its relevance to policy formulation; the
cost/benefit ratio involved; and finally, the possibilities for
improvement. 7
There is surely nothing wrong with the above listing and
Earth recognized that additional criteria could easily be add
ed. From among this large number I will select only two to
add to the three criteria noted earlier for the purposes of this
assessment—the quality of the research and its contribution
to program development and policy.
A first approximation suggests that many of the 2000 pro
jects were of good quality—the subject was sensible, the data
collection and the analyses were carried out in a
workmanlike fashion, and the findings made some contribu
tion to the program or policy. The best among them made
multiple contributions.
With respect to the relation of ORD results to public
policy, a presumptive conclusion is that Congress must have
given the program at least a passing mark because of its will
ingness to keep funding it.
By way of recapitulation, the following five criteria have
been identified as central to the assessment to which this
paper is dedicated:
— The enlargement of the research pool.
— The improvement of the data base.
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— The development of new methodology.
— The quality of the research projects.
— The contribution to public policy.

4. Labor Economics: A Longer View
By way of setting it is important, especially for the orienta
tion of the younger members of the profession, to call atten
tion to the state of "labor economics" (to use the most in
clusive term that was earlier in vogue) that distinguished the
American academic scene prior to the passage of the Man
power Development and Training Act in 1962.
What follows is based largely on memory and personal ex
perience, sharpened by a rereading of the materials referred
to in this assessment. It also clearly shows some of my pre
judices and preferences.
The leaders of labor economics in the 1950s—John
Dunlop, Charles Myers, Frederick Harbison, and Clark
Kerr, the first three of whom were charter members of the
National Council for Employment Policy and also served as
chairmen of the Council in its formative years—were busy
studying the impact of industrialization on labor, primarily
in the developing nations. Without resorting to
psychohistory, a reasonable presumption is that they found
overseas a more exciting research arena than the United
States during the Eisenhower era of goodwill during which
management and unions were getting along and the prob
lems of the poor, the blacks, and women had not yet risen to
a high level of consciousness.
In the mid-1950s, when the National Manpower Council
put the subject of "womanpower" on its agenda of possible
areas for future investigation, the vote in favor of pursuing
the inquiry passed by a single vote! When the final report
Womanpower6 was presented to President Eisenhower he
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remarked: "Oh yes, women were very important in the
European Theater of Operations; they did very good work as
telephone operators, chauffeurs, and nurses"!
At about the same time, one of the more literate members
of the New York banking community was unable to com
prehend what was meant by the term "human resources"
until he was informed that it was a broader term for the
arena usually subsumed under military and civilian man
power. In fact, when Frederick Harbison relocated from the
University of Chicago to Princeton he made a detour via
New York to learn about the range of subjects that the Con
servation of Human Resources Project at Columbia was
working on.
In late 1953, shortly after James P. Mitchell, one of my
favorites among the sixteen Secretaries of Labor with whom
I have consulted, as appointed, he designated an informal
5-man advisory committee to assist him in reorienting the
Department of Labor. Douglas V. Brown of Princeton serv
ed as informal chairman and Kerr and I were members,
together with Cy Ching and a Washington consultant. Our
principal recommendation was that the Department of
Labor should become the manpower agency of the federal
government. Mitchell was comfortable with this recommen
dation but there was very little that he could do in the 1950s
to implement it.
Two more observations. The majority of academicians in
terested in labor economics were based at, or closely aligned
with, industrial relations institutions located at a few of the
major private universities but primarily at the principal state
universities of which Cornell, Michigan, Michigan State, Il
linois, Minnesota, and California, both at Berkeley and at
Los Angeles, were among the leaders.
An inspection of the contents of the Industrial and Labor
Relations Review in the early 1960s discloses that most of the
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issue was given over to a symposium on "Industrial Rela
tions in Latin America." 9 The other three principal articles
dealt with "Fringe Benefits and Overtime as Barriers to Ex
panding Employment," "Labor Relations in the Postal Ser
vice" and "The Relation of the Labor Force to Employ
ment." None of the articles made use of a single regression;
they relied on descriptive statistics—nothing more.
Much the same was true for the first issue of the Journal
of Human Resources which appeared in the summer of
1966. 10 Of the five principal articles on investing in human
capital, the supply of and demand for college teachers, oc
cupational data requirements for education planning, the ef
fects of general education on manpower programs, and the
economics of health, education and welfare, not one made
use of econometrics or mathematical modeling.
So much for the status of labor economics in academe at
the onset of ORD. How did the breakthrough in federal
manpower policy, including research funding, occur? The
successful political initiative owed much to the work and
findings of two committees in the House and the Senate
under Representative Elmer Holland and Senator Joseph
Clark, both of Pennsylvania, during 1960 and 1961. The
committee hearings called attention to the growing incidence
and prevalence of unemployment. Curtis Aller and Garth
Mangum did yeoman service as staff directors of the House
and Senate committees, respectively. It is worth recalling
that the Republicans played a major role in passing the
MDTA legislation.
Further, Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois had worked long
and hard to obtain federal assistance for depressed areas and
the Area Redevelopment Act was finally passed and signed
in 1961 by President Kennedy.
Senator Clark, shortly after the election of President Ken
nedy, asked me to assemble a group of academicians and
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other experts for a meeting with him at the Harvard Club in
New York City to explore a Congressional manpower in
itiative. Arthur Goldberg was one of the invitees, but had to
cancel at the last moment because the President announced
his appointment as Secretary of Labor. Among the major
recommendations that the group made to Senator Clark was
to include in any new legislation a requirement that the Presi
dent submit an annual report on manpower to the Congress
which would help to focus the attention of the nation on the
subject. Further, the group recommended Congress provide
funding for a research and development program.
One more piece of history. Seymour Wolfbein who had
been assigned by Secretary Mitchell and reassigned by
Secretary Goldberg a leading role in the Department of
Labor's emerging manpower efforts, asked me to talk with
the Secretary while the Manpower Development and Train
ing bill was making its way through Congress about the need
for a job creation program to accompany a job training pro
gram. The Secretary heard me out, indicated that he agreed,
but added that the White House would go for a modest train
ing bill and nothing more.

5. Assessment
The basis for the appraisals offered below requires
clarification. I did not read, much less study with care, the
2000 or so completed research investigations. Some of the
reports emerging from the more important research efforts
were known to me since they first were made public and I
have sought to refresh my memory about those that I con
sidered relevant for the present exercise. Further, I turned
the pages and read most of the text in the Compendium and
reviewed with some care the two publications of the National
Academy of Sciences. As noted earlier, I also did some
sampling of the journals to refresh my memory of their
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scope and coverage at the beginning and end of the period
under consideration.
With this preamble, the assessment of ORD's program in
terms of the five criteria that were earlier identified can pro
ceed.

The Enlargement of the Research Pool
There is good reason to believe that in the absence of
ORD's liberal funding for manpower studies, the principal
centers of research in labor economics—the industrial rela
tions centers identified above—would have continued surely
for a long time in their accustomed ways, allocating most of
their resources to problems of collective bargaining and
closely related issues. In fact, even in the presence of multi
ple sources of funding, including not only ORD but also
other federal agencies such as the National Science Founda
tion, National Institutes of Health, and the Departments of
Commerce and HEW, to note only the more important, the
industrial relations centers moved slowly and haltingly to
shift the focus of their research interests towards human
resources and manpower. A few moved energetically, but
most took only small steps.
ORD, faced with this relatively inflexible research struc
ture, moved to institution building, part of the aim of which
was to strengthen the research pool by making a series of
"institutional grants." 11 Most of the grants were funded for
a period of between four and five years with a total of four
rounds of awards between 1966 and 1978. 12 The funds pro
vided for modest staff expansion, some scholarships, cur
riculum building, and some research support. The last two
rounds shifted the program's focus from teaching and
research to professional training for CETA staff in the
several regions of the country.
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A total of just under 50 institutional grants were made. An
early and continuing target was to assist the curricula
development of minority-based colleges and universities so
that they could provide broadened opportunities for their
students to qualify for careers in employment and training. 13
An inspection of the list of grantee institutions suggests that,
aside from the considerable number of minority-based in
stitutions, about ten to a dozen represented universities that
had demonstrated a sustained high level of research capabili
ty in labor economics and/or employment and training.
By far the most exciting undertaking in the arena of
research resource development was the Doctoral Dissertation
Grants program. Almost 500 of these, completed and in pro
cess, are listed in the Compendium. 14 Three publications
prepared by Lawrence Klein, formerly of the Department of
Labor, who relocated to the University of Arizona, provide a
window into those dissertations that were judged to have the
most merit in terms of the quality of the research and the
relevance of the findings. 15
Among the unique characteristics of the dissertational
support program was the fact that ORD encouraged students
from all of the social sciences to apply, and that the selection
committee of outside experts responded by allocating
roughly one-half of the grants to economists and the balance
to other social scientists from anthropology to demography.
The best way to indicate the quality of the grantees is to
list those with whose work I am reasonably well acquainted
who appear on the first 14 pages (10 percent) of the total
listing: Lawrence S. Seidman, Gilbert Cardenas, Gregory
DeFreitas, Lionel J. Hausman, Marjorie H. Honig, Michael
Boskin, Robert D. Reischauer, Jonathan R. Kesselman,
Robert J. Flanagan, Stephan T. Marston, Harvey S. Rosen.
If the foregoing ratio were to hold throughout, it would
mean that this one appraiser would have a more or less in
timate acquaintance with the work of about one-fifth of the
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entire group—no small visibility considering that a con
siderable number of researchers at the time that the Compen
dium was published had not yet completed their projects.
Faced with a gross shortage of manpower researchers,
ORD responded quickly and with imagination to remedy this
most serious of bottlenecks. By establishing the Doctoral
Dissertational Grants program in 1965 and by opening it up
to all social science students who had completed their work
for a doctorate, other than writing their dissertation, ORD
made a major contribution by both attracting high talent in
to the manpower arena and at the same time broadening the
boundaries of the field by encouraging applicants from all of
the social sciences.
The Institutional Grants program was more of a mixed
bag, largely because of strong pressure from the
policymakers to direct much or most of the money to objec
tives other than the advancement of manpower research. I
don't want to convey the impression that the institutional
grants made no contribution to the furtherance of research,
only that their contribution was relatively minor. It should
also be noted that ORD, had it been free to design the pro
gram according to its own preferences, would probably have
spent a large proportion of the total funds at the nation's
strongest academic centers with a demonstrated capability to
undertake significant manpower research. But that option
was not available.

Improving the Data Base
This is the second criterion that we earlier identified to
guide us in this appraisal of ORD's program. As Clark Kerr
recently remarked in "The Intellectual Role of the
Neorealists in Labor Economics," one of the long-term con
tributions of those who focused their attention on the opera
tions of labor and labor markets has been to improve and
correct the faulty assumptions and conclusions of the
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economic theorists about how labor markets operate. 16 In
fact Wassily Leontief, in his sharp and insightful presidential
address to the American Economic Association, took note of
the continuing misallocation of the resources between data
gathering and model construction with the disproportionate
emphasis on the latter. 17
In the mid-1960s, when Daniel Patrick Moynihan was
Assistant Secretary of Labor, he and the director of ORD
took the initiative to devote a considerable proportion of the
then quite modest research budget into a long term effort to
improve the data base by funding the National Longitudinal
Surveys of Labor Force Behavior (NLS) at The Ohio State
University under the leadership of Professor Herbert S.
Parnes in association with the Demographic Survey Division
of the Bureau of the Census.
The NLS study has focused attention on four
groups—older men, middle-aged women, and young people,
both male and female. In 1979 it added a new and enlarged
youth cohort. Its informational net has been cast wide to in
clude a host of variables, including economic, sociological
and psychological, in order to permit study of the interac
tions among the principal forces that determine outcomes of
different groups in the labor market. The NLS deliberately
oversampled for minorities. From the outset, a unique aspect
of the surveys was the frequent reinterviewing of the same in
dividuals.
The Compendium lists the large number of studies of
labor force behavior that derive directly from the NLS. 18 In
her assessment of the NLS, June O'Neill of the Urban In
stitute singled out for special attention three research areas
where the Surveys yielded much valuable new insight:
Unemployment and Related Labor Market Issues; Women's
Labor Force Participation and Male-Female Earnings Dif
ferentials; and Aging and the Retired. 19
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While Parties and his many associates at Ohio State took
the lead in analyzing the rich materials that the Sureys were
yielding, ORD arranged along the line that the research com
munity would have easy and low cost access to the tapes.
Once again, I resorted to a sampling approach to call atten
tion to some of the analysts who, under ORD grants, made
use of the Survey data: D.H. Nafziger, J.L. Holland, Robert
E. Hall, Jacob Mincer, Herman P. Miller, Robert J.
Flanagan, Ernst Stromsdorfer. 20
Those wise in the ways of the Washington bureaucracy
and the halls of Congress will appreciate that the launching
of the NLS was not easy. There is always a strong resistance
to spending governmental funds on data collection. But even
more difficult is to keep a project such as the NLS going.
Next year will mark its twentieth birthday, a remarkably
long life for such an effort. As the editors of Manpower
Research and Labor Economics remarked in their introduc
tory note to Herbert Parnes' article: "The National
Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) constitute a unique research ef
fort in the manpower field; indeed this study is a landmark in
the social sciences as a whole during the past decade." 21
Parnes, with his customary modesty, concluded his interim
assessment with the comment, "There is, of course, no way
of determining whether the National Longitudinal Surveys
have been worth the millions of dollars they have cost." 22
Under the single heading of "Labor Demand," the Com
pendium lists over 100 projects that ORD funded, many of
which had as their primary or secondary aim the improve
ment of the data base. 23 While no one project, nor possibly
the entire group, can approach the NLS, they underscore the
sensitivity of ORD to improving the data sources available to
researchers. In this connection, one must not overlook the
useful appendices prepared by ORD that appear at the end
of the annual Manpower Report of the President, later
renamed the Employment and Training Report of the Presi
dent. The tables therein reproduced and brought up to date
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every year have undoubtedly saved researchers untold hours
in gaining access to current data on which they depend so
heavily.

The Development of New Methodology
As noted in section 3, when this subject was first address
ed, ORD sought not to get too involved in funding projects
the principal aim of which was to develop new methodology.
Despite its self-imposed restraint, one can still identify a
commendable contribution that ORD made to the improve
ment of methodology even though such gains were often
closely related to data improvement, program design and
policy clarification. In the Index of Research Subjects in the
Compendium one finds about 50 titles under
"Methodology" including the following important areas:
accuracy in manpower projections; America's uncounted
people; cost-benefit analysis of manpower programs; income
dynamics of the poor; internal labor markets; job vacancies
in the firm and the labor market; methods of forecasting
short-term unemployment change; occupations—meanings
and measures; short-term manpower projection methods;
and working life tables for the U.S. 24 This one listing under
"Methodology" in no way provides an overview of the full
scope of ORD's efforts in this area. About the same number
of titles are found under "Assessment and Evaluation."
Once again, a useful approach to the quality of these in
vestigations is suggested by noting the names of some of the
researchers and the investigations that they pursued: Robert
E. Hall explored the Keynesian dichotomy between frictional
and involuntary unemployment in periods of full employ
ment; 25 R.A. Gordon, Michael L. Wachter and Karl E.
Taeuber prepared papers on demographic trends and full
employment; 26 Michael J. Boskin explored a model of oc
cupational choice based on the theory of human capital and
estimated by conditional logit analysis; 27 Charles C. Holt
and his associates at the Urban Institute carried on extensive
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studies of job search and labor turnover dynamics in order to
gain a better understanding of employment in an infla
tionary era; 28 Richard A. Easterlin studied long swings in
labor force growth; 29 Stanley Lebergott sought to develop
new methods of forecasting short term unemployment
changes; 30 James G. Scoville addressed conceptual and
measurement problems in occupational analyses; 31 and Orley
Ashenfelter investigated the use of various econometric
models to assess the impacts of training. 32
Imbedded in sections 1 and 2 of the Compendium one
finds methodological contributions from other leading
economists and social scientists including: Finis Welch and
Marvin Kosters; Laurits R. Christensen and Dale N.
Jorgensen; Lawrence R. Klein; Phoebus Dhrymes; Lester C.
Thurow; Edward D. Kalachek and many more with a na
tional and international reputation. 33
By far the largest single financial commitment of ORD to
the improvement of methodology was its liberal multiyear
funding of the Manpower Research and Demonstration Cor
poration evaluation effort carried out under the title of
"Supported Work," with Mathematica as the prime con
tractor and the Poverty Institute at the University of Wiscon
sin as the major subcontractor. The cost of the research,
which was based on random assignment of clients with ex
perimental and control groups and involved baseline inter
views and multiyear follow-up interviews, approximated 11
million dollars. 34
ORD was distressed that with so many billions being in
vested in training programs, definitive answers as to whether
or not they made a difference in terms of postemployment
and earnings experience were hard to produce. Moreover, it
was even more uncertain whether such programs could help
the most disadvantaged groups in the population. Hence its
willingness to spend a large sum on a well-designed research
design that would be properly implemented and where the
results could command respect.
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The results turned out to be mixed: the AFDC mothers
group definitely showed large benefits from work; the results
for the ex-addicts were equivocal; and there were no gains
for the ex-offenders and youth. I was restive from the outset
about the high cost of this evaluation but my colleagues con
vinced me of the value of a scientific evaluation. I also recall
Robert Lampman's warning that the null hypothesis would
probably be sustained.
Before concluding this section on methodology, I would
like to add a few observations. I believe that ORD was cor
rect in not undertaking heavy financing of methodological
inquiries. Had it done so, the odds are strong that it would
have added substantially to its ongoing difficulties of sus
taining support for its research program both within the
Department of Labor and in the Congress. Further I suspect
that many of the most important methodological advances in
the manpower arena, as in other fields of inquiry, are often
the by-products of investigations directed at substantive
goals.
It made sense for both the Congress and the Administra
tion to become interested in evaluating the results of various
programmatic interventions to assist the unemployed and
other disadvantaged groups. But this belated interest, which
blossomed with the passage of CETA in 1973, led to the ex
plosive growth of for-profit firms, many of which were
located in the Washington area, which became highly adept
at pressuring the various federal agencies, including the
Department of Labor, for evaluation contracts. For the most
part, the programs had not been designed and implemented
in terms of participant selection, data collection, controls,
output measures and follow-up to yield meaningful results
when formal evaluation techniques were applied. As sections
4D and 4E in the Compendium make clear, ORD was suc
cessful through 1978 in not bending very far in the direction
of this new enthusiasm. 35 When the new Administration
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came into office in 1981, however, evaluations became a
favorite of the policymakers in the Department of Labor.
One of the opportunities for learning more about the par
ticipants of various training programs that in my view was
largely neglected was to tap into Social Security records for
follow-up information. Admittedly, access to Social Security
records is hard to come by, especially for research purposes;
the matching process is difficult and the limited amount of
follow-up information will constrain what can be learned.
Still, it represents perhaps the least expensive way to get a
fast reading on the effectiveness of large public investments
in employment and training programs.
My direct experience with specially designed evaluation
programs such as "Supported Work" has impressed me with
their cost. On the other hand, attempts to economize, as in
the case of the Youth Entitlement Program (Manpower
Research and Development Corporation and Abt
Associates), by reliance on a matching of so-called "com
parable cities" such as Baltimore and Cleveland, can turn
out to have many disadvantages.

The Quality of the Research Projects
If one were to single out just one, rather than five criteria
with which to assess ORD's program, my preference would
be to use "the quality of the research projects." As I have in
dicated earlier, good research in the social arena will, more
often than not, have a policy orientation and in the process
the researcher will often contribute to enlarging the data base
and score an advance over existing methodology. According
ly, many of the projects that are referred to below, as well as
many previously discussed, could without distortion be plac
ed in other categories since as with all systems of categoriza
tion, but particularly with the one that we are following, a
large element of arbitrariness cannot be avoided.
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About half of the pages of the Compendium are directed
to listing and briefly discussing the research projects under
two principal headings: 1. The Economics, Social and Policy
Background; and 2. The Labor Market. Sections 3 and 4
deal more specifically with training and administration. In
the pages that follow I will comment solely on research pro
jects listed in sections 1 and 2.
There is no possible way for me, without excessive
elaboration, to take note of all the research work that war
rants attention because the investigator addressed an impor
tant subject; he or she dealt with it according to accepted
research canons, and the results make a contribution both to
the pool of knowledge and to public policy.
My selections aim rather to provide the reader an overview
of the range of support that ORD provided and the impor
tant subjects that the research illuminated. In the very first
year, 1963, Margaret S. Gordon studied the European ex
perience with employment and training, thereby providing
U.S. officials with a road map. 36 Benjamin Shimberg and his
colleagues undertook pioneering work in the arena of oc
cupational licensing. 37 David S. North and Marion F. Houstoun produced an important exploratory study of the
characteristics and role of illegal aliens in the U.S. labor
market. 38 Frank Levy and his colleagues Clair B. Vickery
and Michael L. Wiseman contributed significant new
knowledge and understanding to the income dynamics of the
poor. 39
Lester C. Thurow's book on Generating Inequality was
the outgrowth of a research project in which he explored the
concept of job competition in contrast to the neoclassical
wage competition model of the labor market. 40
The final stage of T. Aldrich Finegan's and William G.
Bowen's classic study of labor force participation rates was
supported by ORD. 41
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Richard B. Freeman's basic research on engineers and
scientists in an industrial economy which led to his wellknown work, The Overeducated American, grew out of
ORD support. 42
John T. Dunlop and Daniel Quinn Mills had a series of
grants which enabled them to assess in depth the changing
capacity of the construction industry to adapt to changing
labor requirements and to modify their training systems ac
cordingly. 43
Louis E. Davis of the University of California, Los
Angeles, the father of the Quality of Work Life in the United
States, received early support from ORD which also provid
ed considerable support for the Human Interaction Research
Institute (Los Angeles) as well as for the work of Stanley
Seashore and his colleagues at the Survey Research Center at
the University of Michigan, all of which resulted in a con
siderable number of interesting publications. 44
Sheppard and Belitsky's study, The Job Hunt, published
in the mid-1960s represented a departure. They explored
more broadly than earlier researchers the motivational and
attitudinal dimensions via a case approach of how
unemployed workers look for jobs. 45 This effort reaffirmed
the wisdom of ORD's broader approach to labor market
processes than was characteristic of most economists.
A quite different approach, more ambitious and with
more far-reaching results, was carried out over a five-year
period (1968-73) by F. Ray Marshall of the University of
Texas at Austin in his study Negro Employment in the
South. Six southern cities were the focus of this inquiry:
Atlanta, Birmingham, Houston, Louisville, Memphis and
Miami. Important findings emerged from analysis of the fac
tors that contributed to a lowering of the barriers against
black workers. At the same time, the research pointed to ma-
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jor difficulties that continued to handicap blacks both at the
point of being hired and also in advancing up the job
ladder. 46
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein of Columbia University explored
the factors that hinder or facilitate women's entrance into
such prestigious professions as law, medicine, science, and
academe. The author noted that the early socialization pro
cess of girls and young women as well as later institutionaliz
ed barriers acted to reduce the potential supply. Her analysis
and findings led to a major book entitled Women's Place:
Options and Limits in Professional Careers. 41
The foregoing selections are illustrative of the large
number of important research projects supported by ORD
which covered a wide range of critical policy areas and yield
ed important new knowledge about the operations of the
labor market. The outstanding accomplishment of the
research program, surely in terms of intellectual impact and
long term influence, was the work of Peter B. Doeringer and
Michael Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower
Analysis, which was started in 1966 and completed in 1970. 48
The data that the authors used to study the operations of
manufacturing firms in adjusting to imbalances in labor sup
ply and technological changes were derived from an earlier
project that had also been funded by ORD. The authors
stressed the dynamics of freedom that medium-sized and
large employers have and exercise in making adjustments in
their labor supply through hiring, screening, training,
recruitment, and subcontracting, relying on these ap
proaches much more than on wage adjustments to assure
themselves of the range of workers and skills that they re
quire.
The authors also concluded that disadvantaged members
of the labor force, minorities and women, found it very dif
ficult to break into the sector of stable, internal labor
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markets and were therefore crowded into the "secondary"
labor market characterized by short term, low-skill, lowpaying jobs which in turn had a major impact on the ways in
which such disadvantaged groups adjust to work and life.
The authors concluded that these disadvantaged groups live
on the periphery of the labor market and society and have lit
tle opportunity to join the mainstream. Hence the term, "the
dual labor market."
In the Brookings Papers, Michael L. Wachter undertook a
43-page critique of what he subtitled the "Dual Approach,"
which was followed by comments and discussion including
remarks by Piore. 49 In Wachter's analysis, the dual labor
market approach is predicted on the following: differences in
firm behavior in the high and low wage sectors; a distinction
between good and bad jobs, not between skilled and unskill
ed workers; and movement of workers in the secondary
labor market among low wage jobs and between unemploy
ment and labor force participation.
Wachter concluded that it is wrong to assume that the in
ternal labor market in the primary sector does not follow the
employer's search for efficiency and that it is wrong to dif
ferentiate sharply between the primary and secondary
markets since mobility exists between them. Further, per
vasive underemployment need not be the key characteristic
of the secondary labor market. But Wachter is not all
negative: he believes that the dual labor market theorists
have made significant contributions in focusing on wagesetting behavior in the secondary market; in introducing
feedback effects into their model; and in deepening
understanding of the unemployment mechanism. Each is im
portant and the three together represent a major advance.
In a recent contribution to the Discussion Paper Series of
the Harvard Institute of Economic Research, "Troubled
Workers in the Labor Market," Richard B. Freeman con-
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eludes his review of the dual labor market hypothesis with
the following comment: "In short, the dual market claim
regarding wage determination processes appears to be valid,
but its other assertions have yet to be shown to be empirically
correct." 50 This is no small praise for a theory 14 years after
it was first introduced and after it has been subjected to
repeated and detailed critiques.
The ORD record of quality research projects would have
to be assessed as respectable, if not outstanding, even
without the Doeringer-Piore contribution. But its rating
must be raised once one takes cognizance of the fact that it
subsidized one of the few intellectual breakthroughs in the
conceptualization of labor markets in the decades of the
1960s and 1970s.

Contributions to Public Policy
Although we have noted in passing that many of the pro
jects previously identified have had a direct or indirect im
pact on manpower programs and policies, the investigations
reviewed below have been selected specifically to emphasize
this facet of ORD's total effort. The projects have been
selected with an eye to illustrating the impact of ORD's pro
jects on broad manpower policy as well as on specific pro
grammatic improvements. Some fall in the zone between the
two.
As far as broad policy considerations are concerned, one
can identify projects that encouraged Congress to adopt new
or more expansive stances with respect to public service
employment, extended unemployment insurance, work-fare,
improved articulation between remedial education and skill
training, mobility allowances and upgrading efforts.
The research program also had significant beneficial ef
fects on expanding apprenticeship opportunities for black
men, on placing black women in the South in white-collar
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and technical positions with career opportunities, in helping
ex-offenders to gain a permanent attachment to the labor
market, in helping persuade the courts to permit young peo
ple awaiting trial to participate in supervised work programs,
in persuading the Department of Defense to modify its selec
tion criteria so that a quarter of a million who, under
previous standards, would have been rejected were accepted.
The following pages provide some elaboration of the
foregoing. In the early 1970s, a series of University of
California-based investigations focused on the Bay Area, in
cluding one by Robert A. Gordon and Lloyd Ulman, con
cluded that public service employment could be increased by
10 to 15 percent in low-skilled categories without severe
disruption or costly new inputs. 51 Later in the decade, the
Urban Institute in Washington, under the direction of Lee
Bawden, concluded that opportunities existed for 3 million
public sector jobs in 21 program areas. 52 In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, two ORD contracts with the National Civil
Service League led to an estimate, based on summary data,
that more than 400,000 yearly vacancies were available in
state and local governments for the employment of disadvantaged workers. 53
The foregoing, together with additional projects outlined
in the Compendium under section 3G, "Providing Public
Employment," 54 surely contributed to the decision of Presi
dent Carter to request, and Congress to agree to, a vast in
crease in PSE jobs in the latter years of the 1970s.
The carefully crafted and carried out study of unemploy
ment insurance exhaustees by Mathematica in 1974-7655 con
cluded, among other findings, that UI did not operate as a
serious work disincentive and that even among many who
withdrew from the labor force after their benefits were ex
hausted, a significant proportion wanted to return to
employment. These findings, among others, surely reinforc-
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ed the subsequent actions of the Congress to extend the
periods of coverage, even in the face of budgetary stringen
cies and the opposition of an Administration that sought to
reduce income transfer payments.
The Minnesota Work Equity Program, which got under
way in 1977, sought to test an alternative to income transfers
for welfare clients by providing guaranteed work or training
as alternatives. The principal components were an expansion
of public service jobs at or near the minimum wage, expand
ed training opportunities on the job or in the classroom, and
placement of 10 percent of the clients into unsubsidized jobs.
The lessons learned from this undertaking, evaluated by Abt
Associates, surely encouraged President Reagan and the
Congress to modify existing welfare legislation to encourage
the states to experiment with work-fare. 56 Even without the
benefit of any specific research findings, the Department of
Labor early recognized (1963) that MDTA had to be amend
ed to enable many of the unemployed to undergo a remedial
educational experience before entering upon occupational
training. If my memory is correct, the Director of ORD was
alerted to this need on the basis of his trips to the field during
the early months of the training program. In any event, the
Congress agreed with this assessment.
The most successful linkage between remedial education
and skill training occurred at Job Corps Centers, but only a
small number of disadvantaged youth profited from the ex
perience. In 1977, Congress, in passing the Youth Employ
ment and Training Program, specifically reserved some part
of the total funds, 22 percent, for use by the educational
authorities to encourage them to improve their efforts at
remedial instruction, especially for out-of-school youth who
were returning to school to take advantage of the program.
ORD did not make more than an occasional grant for
remedial education. Again, if my memory serves me correct
ly, this was viewed as the domaim of HEW.
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In the case of "Facilitating Geographic Mobility," the
Congress acted first (1965), directing the Department of
Labor to mount efforts to assist unemployed and
underemployed workers to relocate to areas where there are
more and better jobs available.
Demonstration mobility projects were launched in 28
states and a total of 14,000 workers were relocated. 57 The
Employment Service undertook a major 3-year effort, begin
ning in 1969, to assist farm migrants based in South Texas to
settle out of the migrating stream. Abt Associates undertook
the assessment and published a 4-volume report. 58
The relatively modest number of workers who were suc
cessfully relocated (many who made a successful move later
returned home) and the formidable difficulties encountered
in diverting settlement out of the migrating stream appeared
to me at the time, and also now in retrospect, to explain why
Congress never moved in a big way to subsidize worker
mobility. Politics was an additional barrier. Congressmen
from counties losing population do not readily vote funds to
speed the outmigration of their constituents. The equivocal
results from the demonstrations strengthened their opposi
tion.
ORD, through contacts with Mobilization for Youth and
Howard University in 1965 and 1966, focused on preparing
disadvantaged youth for entrance into paraprofessional oc
cupations with focus on jobs in health care. These early ef
forts provided a favorable backdrop to Congressional action
in 1967 when it passed the New Careers amendment.
Thereafter ORD expanded its upgrading demonstration ef
forts in all three sectors of the economy—private, nonprofit,
government. 59 Among the most interesting and rewarding
was its decade-long effort at the U.S. Atomic Energy Com
mission plants at Oak Ridge where it succeeded in moving a
considerable number of poorly educated local persons into
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skilled and technical jobs through carefully structured learn
ing and on-the-job experiences. 60
The foregoing illustrations of the interface between
ORD's projects and Congressional action do not "prove"
that without the former, legislative action would not have
occurred. All that this suggests is the probability of ORD's
influence, both positive and occasionally negative (mobility),
on Congressional action.
There is a presumption in the United States that the
measure of influence on public policy is best revealed by
Congressional action to pass new laws and make new ap
propriations since by such actions Congress can affect all or
a large part of the entire population. But clearly, as noted
below, ORD had considerable policy impact other than
through persuading Congress to act. We will inspect five
more striking success stories.
F. Ray Marshall and Vernon M. Briggs, Jr. undertook in
1966 and completed the following year a study of 10 major
cities with large black populations aimed at assessing the bar
riers blocking the entrance of blacks into apprenticeship.
The more important recommendations emerging from this
study are set out in the Compendium's abstract. 61 The
critical point for this assessment is to be read in the striking
gains in the numbers of minorities who succeeded in being
accepted as trainees in subsequent years and the striking
gains in the number of journeymen, at least in some, if not
all, unions. Those who followed the lowering of the barriers
have no question that the Marshall-Briggs study, The Negro
and Apprenticeships, 62 served as the wedge that the leader
ship in both the public and private sectors used to ac
complish this striking advance.
The Minority Women Employment Program was another
outstandingly successful effort of ORD. Based on an Atlanta
pilot study of the early 1970s, the aim of the demonstration
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was to determine whether a specially targeted outreach effort
could place college-educated minority women in nontraditional managerial, professional and technical occupations,
primarily in the private sector. In addition to Atlanta, the
program became operational in Dallas, New Orleans, Tulsa,
Cincinnati and Los Angeles. The major steps in the program
were to identify desirable openings, to coach and support
likely candidates to increase their prospects of being hired
and then to help them to retain their jobs. By 1978, five years
into the program, over 1300 women had been placed, with
many of them representing the first minority women ever
hired into these higher level positions. 63
Starting in the very first year of MDTA, ORD focused
considerable effort and resources in assisting prisoners and
ex-offenders through a series of imaginative and often dif
ficult and risky demonstrations. These involved gaining ap
proval of the prison authorities to provide training for in
mates by taking advantage of the 1966 amendments to
MDTA which no longer limited eligible trainees to persons in
the labor force. In the late 1960s, ORD funding enabled the
Vera Institute in New York City to undertake two pioneering
projects using pretrial interventions to provide persons under
arrest and awaiting trial with training and employment op
portunities. If the trainee's performance warranted, the pro
ject staff recommended dismissal of the charges. 64
Still another, relatively late, effort was to provide transi
tional financial aid to newly released prisoners to assist them
in making it back in civilian society and into the world of
work. At the time when the Compendium was being publish
ed ORD had achieved some successes together, as one might
have anticipated, with some failures. But it must not be
overlooked that the resources available to ORD to help this
large population were quite limited.
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The last impact study goes back to the earliest days of
ORD—to 1964—when it carried out a study for the Presi
dent's Task Force on Manpower Conservation focusing on
youth disqualified for military service. 65 The Report recom
mended that approximately one-third of all the young men
turning 18 would, if examined, fail to qualify for induction
into the Armed Forces for reasons of inadequate health or
education. Most of the latter had been reared in poverty. The
results of the study were used by the President to persuade
Secretary of Defense McNamara to accept a large group
(about 250,000 eventually) of below-standard men in the
hope and expectation that through remedial assistance in the
military they could be turned into effective servicemen.
While the Pentagon was equivocal about the results, I reach
ed a positive conclusion. 66

6. A Personal Summing Up
Now that my formal assessment has been completed, the
reader is free to make his own judgment about how well
ORD scores on the five criteria that have been used to review
its progress over the 16-year period, 1963-78. I will add my
own judgment at the very end, but not before I comment
briefly on some critical factors that have not been introduced
up to this point but which I believe must be considered
before a balanced judgment can be made. The hitherto ex
cluded considerations deal respectively with certain
developments in both the academic and political en
vironments, each of which helps to define the parameters for
any large-scale governmental research and development pro
gram in human resources and manpower.
To treat the academic issues first: most of the energy of
academic economists since the university first captured the
discipline has been directed to refining the intellectual corpus
and perfecting successive techniques, the most recent being
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the dominance of mathematical model-building and
econometrics. Progress in a social discipline surely depends
in part on improvements in theory and advances in technique
but it also depends on problem identification, data improve
ment, and first approximations that yield new understanding
and that can contribute to policy guidance. It is my judgment
that because of the pedagogic imperatives of the university
which involves training and testing of students, the former
always predominates to the relative neglect of the latter.
To make matters worse, the more emphasis is placed on
the demonstration of technical competence by students
rather than on the reliance on their written work, the greater
the gap between the discipline and the inchoate world of
reality.
A few points of illumination. I recall Arthur F. Burns
remarking to me in the early 1960s that in his opinion his col
leagues in Fayerweather Hall (the then home of the Colum
bia Economics Department) were off the wall since the
curves which they put on the blackboard were used inter
changeably to describe wages, prices, international trade,
money and still other key variables.
In 1970 or 1971 the National Institute of Education asked
a few consultants to discuss youth unemployment and what
the schools might do to mitigate the curse. A Chicago
economist, who later won the Nobel Prize, said "You know,
Eli, all one has to do is wait. They'll grow out of it." I sug
gested that some, perhaps many, might not since they would
be the victims of homicide, become drug addicts, or spend
years in prison.
In 1964 Gary Decker published Human Capital and within
a relatively few years his approach had come to dominate the
field of "labor economics" at most of the country's leading
universities. All that one need do is to scan the journals from
the late 1960s to the present. A never-ending stream of
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econometric exercises has emerged in which novitiates seek
to measure the influence of one or more factors on the
employment and/or wages and/or career progression of in
dividuals with differing endowments and achievements.
No one will question that Decker opened up a powerful
line of analysis but the value of the inquiries informed by his
approach depends in no small measure on the quality of the
extant data and in most cases the data vary from poor to very
poor. The combination of econometrics coming into its own
and the availability of the human capital model proved a
powerful combination that left its mark on ORD in the
1970s. In Glenn Cain's judgment it was all to the good, 67 but
the editors of the Industrial and Labor Relations Review ac
cording to their recent note to prospective authors appear to
have developed some second thoughts. 68
It is an old question in new form—how much does one
need to know about the institutional framework to make
significant advances in understanding the operations of
labor markets and the behavior of workers? I believe the
answer is—a great deal.
But the world of academe has compounded the situation
in still another respect. The dominance until recently of the
neo-Keynesians with their reliance on a relatively small
number of basic relationships to explain the level of ag
gregate employment must be seen as another impediment to
progress. And when the theory ran afoul of an accelerating
inflation after 1965, the doctrines that sought to replace
Keynes, a worsening Phillips' curve, the increase in the
natural rate of unemployment, and the elaboration of ra
tional expectations created an unseemly spectacle of an
analytic engine out of control. And that is where the
academy stands at the beginning of 1984.
As I look back to the early days of the New Deal I find
four arenas of public policy issues in the manpower or-
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bit—unemployment, income for those who have no work or
can't work, discrimination, and equality of career oppor
tunity. This is my assessment of how well, or how poorly, we
have done to cope.
With respect to unemployment the American public, as is
so frequently the case, has not taken its own laws seriously
and full employment is not high on the nation's agenda. I
have found it irresponsible and cynical for a nation to insist
that everybody, other than the sick, the injured and the
elderly, take care of himself and his dependents and yet
makes no serious effort to provide jobs for those who can't
find an opening because there is a shortage of jobs.
We have done well in providing income for most of the
elderly. Few remain in poverty once one takes in-kind
transfers into account. With respect to single parents and
their children even in states with relatively liberal payments,
we know that money alone does not suffice. What is re
quired, and how to intervene remain elusive. Here we need
more knowledge.
Again in the case of discrimination, the record is
equivocal. If one measures the progress of blacks from 1940,
the gains have been appreciable; if the starting date is 1619,
then progress has been abysmally slow. Many are fortunately
joining the middle class; many others are regrettably still in a
marginal role. Laws can help but full employment and white
leadership are even more important.
With respect to expanding career opportunities for those
from low income homes we have made good progress since
1958 when the Congress passed the National Defense Educa
tion Act. But the broadest opportunities are those providing
for young people who are qualified to enter college. There is
a group who never get properly educated in the basics
without which most of them are doomed to a blighted
future. We must get our public educational system to work
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better and it cannot do so all by itself. Improvements in the
economy and in the country are also needed. Youngsters will
make the effort to learn if they see some hope of benefiting.
But such hope is absent for many who are brought up
without a father, on welfare grants and are educated by
teachers who fear or dislike them.
Some people believe that Congress has appropriated too
much money in the past for these programs. My concern is
different: our return per dollar expended has been relatively
small and it is that issue which we must address.
Ours is a democracy and Congress' main task is to ap
propriate money to help achieve federal objectives, but it is
forced to rely primarily on lower levels of government and
the private sector to transform the dollars which it ap
propriates into useful goods and services. But the instrumen
talities through which Congress is forced to work have their
own objectives and priorities with the result that the efficien
cy and efficacy of federal dollar outlays are greatly reduced.
To complicate matters further, the political arena con
tributes to an instability in administration, the dominance of
an annual budgetary cycle, log-rolling in the halls of the
Congress, and a calculus in which political gain is frequently
at odds with program accomplishment.
We are now at the end. ORD in my view was on balance a
highly successful effort. It must be adjudged that much more
successful considering the sorry state of academe on which it
was largely dependent for research proposals and for their
implementation and on that unique American institution,
the Congress, for financing, redesign and sustained support.
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Appendix
From my perspective, Conservation of Human Resources
(CHR), Columbia University, made significant contribu
tions in opening up or addressing the following lines of
analysis: the pluralistic economy, producer services, health
manpower, comparative manpower studies (Europe and
Japan), metropolitanism and suburbanization, the labor
market as an information system, labor market segmenta
tion, measuring public output, professional women, regional
econometric models, and the theory of human resources.
I am listing below some of the more important research
projects carried out by CHR that were supported in whole or
in part by ORD during the period 1963-78.
Dale L. Hiestand. Economic Growth and Employment
Opportunities for Minorities (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1964).
Eli Ginzberg, Dale L. Hiestand, and Beatrice G. Reubens.
The Pluralistic Economy (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1965).
James W. Kuhn. Scientific and Managerial Manpower
in Nuclear Industry (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1966).
Harry I. Greenfield. Manpower and the Growth of Pro
ducer Services (New York: Columbia University Press,
1966).
Harry I. Greenfield with Carol Brown. Allied Health
Manpower: Trends and Prospects (New York: Colum
bia University Press, 1969).
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Dean Morse. The Peripheral Worker (New York: Colum
bia University Press, 1969).
Eli Ginzberg with Miram Ostow. Men, Money, and
Medicine (New York: Columbia University Press,
1969).
Beatrice G. Reubens. The Hard-to-Employ: European
Programs (New York: Columbia University Press,
1970).
Thomas M. Stanback, Jr. and Richard Knight. The
Metropolitan Economy: The Process of Employment
Expansion (New York: Columbia University Press,
1970).
Ivar E. Berg. Education and Jobs: The Great Training
Robbery (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).
Dale L. Hiestand. Changing Careers After 35 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1971).
Charles Brecher. Upgrading Blue Collar and Service
Workers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972).
Ivar E. Berg (ed.). Human Resources and Economic Wel
fare: Essays in Honor of Eli Ginzberg (New York: Co
lumbia University Press, 1972).
Stanley Friedlander with Robert Shick. Unemployment in
the Urban Core: An Analysis of 30 Cities with Policy
Recommendations (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1972).
Boris Yavitz and Dean Morse. The Labor Market: An
Information System (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1973).
Richard Knight. Employment Expansion and Metropol
itan Trade (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).
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Charles Brecher. Where Have All the Dollars Gone?
Public Expenditures for Human Resources Develop
ment in New York City, 1961-1971 (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1974).
Alice M. Yohalem with Captain Quentin B. Ridgeley.
Desegregation and Career Goals: Children of Air Force
Families (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974).
Marcia Freedman with Gretchen Maclachlan. Labor Mar
kets: Segments and Shelters (Montclair: Allanheld,
Osmun & Company, 1976).
Eli Ginzberg. The Human Economy (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976).
Robert Cohen. The Corporation and the City (NTIS
PB284371/AS, 1978).
David Lewin, Raymond D. Horton, and James W. Kuhn.
Manpower Utilization and Collective Bargaining in
Local Government (Montclair: Allanheld, Osmun &
Company, 1979).
Alfred S. Eichner and Charles Brecher. Controlling Social
Expenditures: The Search for Output Measures (Mont
clair: Allanheld, Osmun & Company, 1979).
Alice M. Yohalem. The Careers of Professional Women:
Commitment and Conflict (Montclair: Allanheld,
Osmun & Company, 1979).
Beatrice G. Reubens. The Youth Labor Supply: A Com
parative Sudy (Montclair: Allanheld, Osmun & Com
pany, 1979).
Matthew Drennan. Regional Econometric Models: New
York and Baltimore (forthcoming).
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A brief discussion of each of the foregoing together with
related research investigations supported by other funding
sources are set out in The Fortieth Anniversary Report, 1979
of the Conservation Project.
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A Research Agenda
for Employment
and Training Policy
in the Eighties
Daniel H. Saks
Many analysts regard "policy research" as a contradiction
in terms. The only kind of research that many who make or
influence decisions want to see are "findings" that confirm
the wisdom of their past judgments and current policy posi
tions. A substantial fraction of research supported by
policymakers is exactly of this advocacy variety. My relative
ly brief experience in Washington did not, however, turn me
into a complete cynic on this question. I have seen situations
where good research has changed people's minds and even
situations where a demonstrated public interest prevailed
over a private gain. That sort of research is the focus of this
agenda for policy research on employment and training pro
grams.
Good policy research should result in good programs. And
good employment and training programs have as a defining
characteristic the increasing of potential earnings of par
ticipants above what they would otherwise have been. There
may be other good or bad consequences of such programs.
The ones I care about are increases in lifetime potential com43
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pensation from the labor market. Even where an employ
ment and training program is designed to redistribute income
within the economy, it is redistribution that takes the form
of higher subsequent earnings for the participant. That is
what makes it an employment and training program rather
than an income transfer program.
This essay is divided into two parts. Part one develops my
priorities for the Department of Labor's vastly diminished
research budget. It argues that good data collection is the
primary federal research role. None of the important policy
questions can be resolved without good data, and the collec
tion of such data is the unique responsibility of the federal
authorities. At current budget levels, the first responsibility
is to maintain existing longitudinal data sets. Then we must
begin to collect adequate data on program participants and
similar nonparticipants so we can determine whether pro
grams are working and under what conditions. Even a bare
bones research effort of this type would exhaust current
budgets of the Office of Research and Evaluation of the
Employment and Training Administration. I argue that the
level of research expenditures should be closer to the levels of
the Administration's original request for 1984 and to the
levels that prevailed in the late 1970s.
The second part of this essay elaborates a more complete
agenda for research and is directed to researchers and
funders of all sorts. It follows what I take to be the natural
set of questions to ask about an employment and training
system. Finding the answers to these questions is the ra
tionale for an employment and training research policy. The
questions are:
1. Who should be the target of employment and training
programs?
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2. What are the best potential "treatments" or sequences
of "treatments" for specific types of potential par
ticipants?
3. How should the employment and training system be
organized and financed to best deliver the appropriate
services to the appropriate participants?
Even though these three questions will be treated in
separate subsections, it should be noted that there is poten
tial interplay among the three types of questions. For exam
ple, if members of a particular group are in trouble in the
labor market yet no employment and training program
would help them, they should not be a target for such pro
grams. Similarly, if members of a particular group will not
participate in a program, they should not be a target for par
ticipation in that program. So these three questions define
interrelated components in the design of an effective employ
ment and training system.
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I. Research Priorities for the Employment
and Training Administration in the Eighties
With the end of the massive research and development ef
forts of the Youth Office, federal support for employment
and training research is now almost totally concentrated in
the Office of Research and Evaluation of the Employment
and Training Administration. Table 1 shows the course of
budget authority and outlays for that office by itself over the
past seven years:
Table 1. Budget for Office of Research and Evaluation,
Employment and Training Administration
(in millions of dollars)
Budget
Authority
Outlays

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

18.8
15.8

21.3
18.4

21.3
19.5

21.3
14.6

7.9
19.4

14.3
11.9

12.2
13.1

Readers will note the substantial if erratic reduction in ex
penditures under the Reagan Administration, though had it
not been for the parochial intervention of a Democratic com
mittee chairman, budget authority in 1984 would have
returned at the Administration's request to the much higher
nominal level of the late 1970s. I am sorry to note that the
Administration's budget requests for 1985 are only for cur
rent services. In the face of such cutbacks, what should the
research priorities of the Employment and Training Ad
ministration be?
The most important research function of the federal
government in this area is collecting what might be called
"problem" data for analysis of why poor earnings are
generated and how actual and potential programs might
raise such earnings. Private individuals will not collect or
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disseminate such data since the costs vastly exceed any
potential private benefits. It also makes little sense for states
to collect data that would be useful to all of them and might
make some of them seem incompetent. Valid empirical
research depends first on good data and the federal govern
ment must be the unit of government to collect it.
The most important type of data for the government to
collect is longitudinal information on the same individuals
through time. This type of data has two unique virtues. First,
it allows us to observe and control for effects of differences
among people that persist through time. And this sort of
population heterogeneity is one of the main problems for
employment and training policy. Who should participate in
such programs and how can we sort out program effects
from unobserved differences among people? Longitudinal
data are extremely helpful for answering such questions.
Second, such data can help us identify answers to the ques
tions that have the greatest impact on federal budget policy:
how do decisions about work, family, consumption, and
other matters in one period affect results in some subsequent
period. The essence of employment and training investments
is trading lower earnings now for higher earnings later. How
these investments occur and how they might be improved are
the key research questions for us. But similar questions arise
for Medicaid, Medicare, AFDC, Social Security, and the
disability programs.
Readers will recognize that I am arguing for the National
Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) as the single most important
research function of the Employment and Training Ad
ministration. That item is where I would draw the wagons in
a circle; of course, I hope it would not come to that. I am
saying that it is the starting point.
This means that we should not let such longitudinal panels
stop for transitory budget savings. The reason is simple. The
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costs of reconstituting such a sample when reason finally
prevails are enormous. Consider the resource costs alone.
The new youth cohort of the NLS cost about $2.5 million to
start up. The entire NLS with all of its cohorts will cost less
than twice that to maintain. But the real cost of stopping a
cohort is in having to wait for years to build up enough
history on individuals to get answers to important questions.
Can we really afford to wait a decade to reconstitute a panel
with enough history to answer questions we need answered
about who is in trouble in the labor market, why, and what
the probable course of earnings of program participants
might have been in the absence of program participation?
My desire to keep the NLS alive does not mean I believe it
to be the most sensible way to meet federal longitudinal data
responsibilities in this area for all time. Just because Labor
Department personnel had the foresight to initiate the NLS,
why should it continue to be a primary responsibility of the
Employment and Training Administration? Other
longitudinal panels have been collected by other agencies. It
is time for a coordinated approach to such data and it is time
for the design and acquisition of such data to be passed on to
the independent data collection agencies where they belong.
The resources and the responsibilities for the NLS should
probably now be turned over the the Bureau of Labor
Statistics where decisions about data needs and costs can be
shared better both within and across agencies and where
decisions about how to change the size and duration of par
ticular cohorts could be made on statistical grounds and not
on the vagaries of political interests in active labor market
policies. So when I argue for not using the NLS as the bridge
over a temporary budget crisis, I am not arguing for im
munity—only for a jury trial by its peers and a restraining
order to prevent irreparable damage.
I would, however, go much further than simply keeping
NLS from dying. The major policy responsibility of the
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Employment and Training Administration is to find out
whether its programs are working and to identify which pro
grams work best for which potential participants. Data are
required that link subsequent labor market outcomes to
specific "treatments" and sequences of "treatments" for the
disadvantaged. And, of course, we need variation in
"treatments" or controls in order to make some judgment
about program effectiveness. The Continuous Longitudinal
Manpower Survey (CLMS) was a complete failure at answer
ing the most important policy questions about the programs.
All we learned was that certain broad categories of program
appeared to be more effective for women than men in the
mid-1970s. The Labor Department's refusal to collect ade
quate process data must be rectified if we are to have any
idea about how to improve the employment and training
system and not just whether to keep it.
This need for good process and outcome data in sufficient
detail to evaluate programs at least in major states is par
ticularly acute under the current Job Training Partnership
Act, since so much authority has passed to the states with so
little federal monitoring of activities. In a couple of years,
Congress will want to know whether the Job Training Part
nership Act is nothing but a transfer of funds to the states.
And the states will want to know what programs are effective
for which groups in which circumstances. Process and out
comes must be better linked. The CLMS was only a poor
start. The message is not to scuttle CLMS-type activities but
rather to expand them and do them correctly. And next time,
we should not have time and resources drained by the sort of
unsatisfactory official analysis that accompanied release of
each CLMS wave. If the lack of an official analysis makes
some bureaucrats cringe, then it simply illumines more
sharply the problem of trying to do nonadvocacy research in
the current institutional setting and Congress might well con
sider how to make program evaluation more independent.
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Program data collection should be linked to participant
data and these should be linked to control group data such as
the NLS or other federal longitudinal data surveys. Further,
we need to collect data on the participation process itself so
we can better learn how to adjust our results for selection
bias (programs appearing to work or not work because the
unobserved characteristics of the participants were
systematically biased toward success or failure). Put simply,
we need to understand how people get selected or select
themselves for services. Not only is that question important
in its own right, but it is essential to sorting out program im
pacts from selection impacts. This whole program data col
lection effort will cost at least as much as the NLS and would
exhaust current ETA research budgets. Linkages with Social
Security and other program administration data can give us
more information for the dollar, but it will still be hard to
collect much program evaluation data at required levels of
detail and stay within current budget levels.
In order for this system to work well, other activities are
required that could easily be done if we could return to the
budget levels of the late seventies. First, the data need to be
available in a highly subsidized, well-designed, on-line data
base system so that researchers with a microcomputer and a
modem can easily use the data. The National Opinion
Research Center and The Ohio State University are taking
only the first steps toward such a system now. Second, an in
dependent committee needs to be established by ETA to
decide how to add special questions to the NLS and how to
add regularly new entrants to the cohorts in the sample. The
model should be the way access is arranged for the federal
research facilities in the natural sciences. I reiterate this point
below, but we need to close the loop in social science
research between anomalous findings and the generation of
new data to shed light on mysteries. And we also need new
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entrants to the cohorts so we can sort out vintage changes
from maturation effects within cohorts.
Finally, we need to provide small grants to researchers to
help with the analysis. The model should be the dissertation
grants program. Even senior researchers can occasionally be
hired in return for summer money, research and clerical
assistance, graduate student support and access to good
data. And if the senior researchers need more, they are more
likely to find funding elsewhere. The highest payoff is prob
ably from using young academic researchers.
In this section, I have outlined what I would do with the
level of research budgets observed in the late 1970s. I have
not included any funds for evaluation of potential new pro
grams (so-called demonstration or pilot projects) because my
conclusion from our experience in the 1970s is that such
research is costly relative to what we might learn. Of course,
if states can be talked into planned variations that can be
evaluated, the federal government could cheaply and effec
tively do some of that evaluation. But the program money
would have to come out of programs and the federal govern
ment would have to be able to walk away from some of those
demonstrations on the grounds that the program operators
made serious evaluation impossible.
What follows are some more specific proposals for
research at budget levels in excess of those in place at the end
of the 1970s. They represent some of my wish list for foun
dations and agencies of all sorts. I reiterate, however, that
almost none of them are feasible or even worthwhile unless
the basic data base requirements are taken care of first.
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II. Who, What, and How?
Who Should Be Helped?
Since the goal of employment and training programs is to
improve unsatisfactory earnings, the first task is to identify
the sources of low earnings. Understanding the generation of
low earnings has two extremely important uses in the design
of an employment and training system: first, it helps in iden
tifying the appropriate target groups for such programs and,
second, it plays an important role in the evaluation of pro
grams by describing the probable course of earnings in the
absence of any program intervention. Thus, good targeting
and good evaluation both depend upon a good understand
ing of what economists call earnings functions. Of course,
economists have estimated literally thousands of earnings
functions over the past few decades. I would argue, however,
that some new emphases are required.
Earnings functions have several components to them.
First, the earnings themselves can be divided into hours of
work and wages per hour. Programs may affect these com
ponents differently for different groups. Second, there are
the characteristics of the earners associated with especially
low earnings. These include the education, training, and
work experience of the earner—all of which might be directly
changed by an effective employment and training program.
Other personal characteristics include the race, sex, and
ethnic background of the earner. These might be associated
with discrimination in the labor market and might suggest
where compensatory and antidiscrimination policies could
be helpful. Nonpersonal characteristics often associated with
poor earnings include the industry and occupation of regular
employment and the condition of the labor market in which
the earner normally resides.
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The third component of earnings functions includes the
fixed but typically unmeasured characteristics of earners.
Even though these characteristics are unmeasured, we know
about them from the simple fact that earnings of apparently
similar individuals differ in persistent ways. The final com
ponent of the earnings function is what might be called the
shock or dislocation factor. People have good or bad years
and sheer luck can propel them to a temporary or permanent
change in their earnings. Even though these are random
events, we can still learn about the typical size of such shocks
and about the typical trajectory of earnings differentials
associated with such shocks.
Economists have learned a great deal about the shape of
earnings functions in the past decade. 1 We know that train
ing programs have a greater effect on the hours of work of
participants than they do on the wages of successful par
ticipants. We know that education and experience account
for something like a quarter of the variance in earnings. We
know that other personal variables account for perhaps a
fifth of the variance of earnings. And we know that other
unmeasured fixed characteristics of earners account for
perhaps another quarter of the variance of earnings. We also
know that almost two-thirds of any shock to normal earn
ings fades away within one year. In short, we can label
perhaps half the correlates of variance in earnings observed
in the population. Whether one considers the glass to be half
full or half empty is not entirely a matter of taste.
Understanding the unobserved portions of the earnings func
tion needs to become a high priority if we are to understand
how to match programs to individuals. Progress requires
cooperative research projects among social science
disciplines.
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I would identify the following important research issues
on earnings functions for consideration:
1. Why should hours of work be more responsive to
employment and training programs than the wages per hour?
Do employers establish a set of minimum characteristics for
potential employees at a given wage and only hire those who
have those characteristics? Are there differences between
employment and training interventions that affect hours and
interventions that affect earnings? Are some types of poten
tial participants more susceptible to hourly earnings gains
and others to hours gains?
2. How can we develop less superficial measures of per
sonal characteristics and of personal capacities? How, for in
stance, do we adjust years of schooling and types of ex
perience on the job to reflect differences in quality of those
experiences that might be systematic across certain members
of the population? One particularly acute problem in the
employment and training area is that we are interested in
programs that affect long term earnings and yet we want to
evaluate programs quickly. This means that we have to
develop tests that can measure changes in earnings-related
characteristics of individuals. These should help define the
content of programs as well. There already exist several tests
for certain types of vocational skills and these need to be
developed further. Since the Army is currently engaged in
fairly elaborate analysis of skills required for certain jobs,
more collaboration between civilian and military employ
ment and training interests might pay off. The crucial point
is to develop measures of skills and other characteristics
which are in turn related to subsequent earnings gains. In
deed, such tests would be validated by earnings gains.
3. We need to learn more about the nature of those fixed,
unmeasured characteristics that account for at least a quarter
of the variance in earnings in the population and are, I would
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argue, the most crucial portion in understanding concen
trated earnings problems. Econometric techniques can iden
tify for study individuals with persistently low earnings given
their other characteristics. The defect of current social
science research is the alienation of analysis from data collec
tion. Unlike the natural sciences where a peculiar finding
results in the design of new tests and the acquisition of new
data, in the social sciences that linkage is much less evident.
Those individuals with large negative fixed characteristics
need to receive in-depth analyses. Simple massaging of ex
isting data sets is not going to resolve these questions about
health, motivation, decisionmaking and other factors. Even
Herbert Parnes, who has collected one of the most important
data sets available to modern social scientists has noted this
problem:
After examining a computer print-out of the rele
vant information for an individual, one generally
longs for an opportunity to talk to her or him for
an account of why things happened as they did and
how this respondent reacted. 2
The loop must be closed to understand why some are
special and what this implies about employment and training
programs for them. This might involve both special inter
views and also planned variation in providing employment
and training strategies for such people. One way of identify
ing a problem is to see what helps remove it.
4. It is important to explore differences in the recovery of
individuals from negative earnings shocks or dislocations.
These are typically modeled as first order Markov processes;
is this the best characterization? How do the fade-out rates
(transition probabilities) vary with the characteristics of the
individuals involved and their situations? Neither industry
nor occupation are good predictors of how rapidly an earn
ings shock fades away, but general levels of unemployment
in the local labor market are important. Why? One of the
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difficulties facing programs for dislocated workers (workers
with decent jobs who suddenly find themselves unemployed
because of technological advance, competition, or reduced
demand for their products) is determining who will likely be
in long term trouble and who will recovery quickly. This was
a special problem of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act
programs. It is a particular worry because provision of at
tractive programs for those who rebound quickly by
themselves might delay their recovery and waste scarce
resources. Learning how to target such programs means
learning which individuals will have the slow fade-out rate
for shocks. Again, it may mean in-depth analyses after they
are identified.
5. How do low earners move among labor markets, firms,
jobs within firms, and occupations? We have little
understanding of the way in which unobserved
characteristics affect both low earnings and mobility deci
sions. It may be that one of the better employment and train
ing strategies for many involves incentives to workers and
employers for mobility. What we seem to know from the
literature on mobility is that there are movers and there are
stayers. Why? Are these fixed, immutable characteristics?
Can we find some way of distinguishing between these two
categories before the fact as an aid in targeting various pro
grams. Again, it requires statistical analysis to identify the
stayers and clever probing to figure out why.

What Should Be Done? Toward Better
Program Design for Particular Groups
If we have learned anything over the past two decades
about employment and training programs, it is that different
programs work better for different groups (and that some do
not work at all). Discussion of research on program effec
tiveness should therefore be organized by particular groups
among those most likely to be distressed workers. This is not
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the place for a detailed argument about who is likely to be a
distressed worker in the 1980s since I have only recently
reviewed the evidence about that. 3 I will simply discuss pro
gram research issues for the four key groups that might be in
labor market distress: 1) youth having difficulty breaking in
to the labor market; 2) disadvantaged adults with low nor
mal earnings; 3) dislocated experienced workers; and
4) distressed older workers.
Before turning to programs for those particular groups, I
will consider macroeconomic policy because that affects all
these groups. There is a division of labor in economic policy
for dealing with the problems of distressed workers. There
are the cyclically unemployed and underemployed and for
them, by definition, the best program is a buoyant labor
market. The other distressed workers are those who are,
again by definition, structurally underemployed,
unemployed, or poverty wage workers. The demarcation
between these sets has been the subject of debates among
economists for generations. 4 The more recent form of the
argument is over whether there is a level of overall
unemployment below which the inflation rate begins to ac
celerate. Whether or not such a point exists, most agree that
there are limits to how much overall macroeconomic
stimulus can accomplish in eliminating unemployment and
poverty level earnings. Because the limits on general demand
stimulus are so important to employment and training
policy, an agenda for research on macroeconomic issues
belongs in the list of research issues discussed here. My en
tries are:
1. How should business cycle conditions affect the mix of
services provided by the employment and training system?
This is a broad question on which many have already taken a
position. For example, I have argued5 that the current
employment and training system with no public service
employment and few support services might have made sense
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in the more normal labor market of the late 1970s and the
programs of that period might have made more sense now in
dealing with the long term unemployed who have exhausted
their unemployment benefits and for whom welfare is not a
viable option. Part of my argument rests on the difficulty of
enforcing a work test for the long term unemployed who
might otherwise be helped by extended unemployment in
surance benefits during such a severe recession. Offering
help in the form of a job may assure fewer adverse incen
tives. But this is only a hypothesis worth examining. Are
long term unemployed better off with a public job and is
society better off transferring aid to them via such a
mechanism? The supported work experiments examined the
effectiveness of the well-designed sheltered workshop for the
disadvantaged, but we have not adequately explored its value
for the cyclically unemployed. Please note, I am not naive
enough to think this would be a research priority of the cur
rent Administration. But it is a strategy that ought to be of
interest, especially in the context of workfare proposals. The
parallel question is whether it makes sense to spend much
money on training when unemployment is this high? Will
such workers at best simply displace other workers? The
displacement question is just as important for training pro
grams as it was for public service employment programs.
2. What sets the limits for the employment-expanding
possibilities of overall economic policy and how do these
limits vary? Demographic characteristics have been em
phasized in past research, but to say that there are more
youngsters and women in the labor force and that the
unemployment rate is higher is simply to relabel our ig
norance. We know that unemployment consists of short
spells by many and long spells by a few. We must disentangle
those two components in our analysis of the relation between
labor market conditions and inflation. Short spells might ac
tually increase as the labor market becomes tighter and there
is more job mobility; but why is long term unemployment so
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relatively unresponsive? What structural programs would in
crease the responsiveness of the long term unemployed to
buoyant labor markets? An additional limit on use of
macropolicy to reduce labor market distress has been the in
flationary impact of capacity utilization on product markets.
As recently as 1973, labor and product markets appeared to
tighten simultaneously. In the late 1970s, it appeared that
produce market pressures on prices occurred well before
labor market pressures. Why should such a disconnection
occur?
3. How might government reduce inflationary labor
market pressures without incurring such excessive costs
among those who are at the margin of distress or poverty?
We have known for some time that it takes an extra 1 percent
unemployed for two years to lower the inflation rate by 1
percentage point. That relationship has held for some years
and it gives an idea of how costly it is to fight inflation
through the labor market, especially when poor workers suf
fer disproportionately from increases in unemployment. Are
there ways of targeting deflationary pressures to increase
their efficiency or are there ways of arranging real wage cuts
in response to shocks like the OPEC oil price increases
without incurring such heavy social costs? In our decentraliz
ed labor markets, the idea of income policies to coordinate
such reductions is attractive and may yet be needed in the
1980s. Understanding how wage increases diffuse through
the economy thus becomes important for understanding how
to coordinate anti-inflation and employment and training
strategies.
We turn now to a discussion of program research for each
of the four distressed groups enumerated above. It should be
noted that the Labor Department has supported so much
research over the past two decades that many of the issues
mentioned below have been touched upon in one project or
another and so what follows is an agenda for continuing
research as well as new research. 6
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Distressed Youth
Although youth unemployment rates are high, most youth
have relatively little trouble entering the labor market.
However, a concentrated group of youth (somewhere be
tween 5 and 10 percent) do have considerable difficulty.
They suffer long term unemployment and this results in
lower earnings later in their lives. Youth from poor families
with poor education and, if black, the additional problems
of discrimination face horrendous problems in the labor
market. An enormous amount of extremely useful research
was mounted in the 1970s. I would recommend the following
topics for further consideration:
1. How should alternative schools be designed for high
school dropouts and potential dropouts? The Youth Incen
tive Entitlement Pilot Projects showed that the offer of a job
and an alternative school had little impact on dropping out
of school, but it did cause many who had already dropped
out to go into an alternative school program. There is much
less indication of any impact on graduation rates, though
perhaps some earnings impacts. In the new Administration's
unseemly haste to close down the previous Administration's
research efforts, many important questions were left
unanswered. Was it the offer of a job or the offer of an alter
native school or both that caused this return to a schooling
program? What was the impact of that alternative schooling
on the functional literacy of those who participated? These
key questions should be the subject of a major research ef
fort on youth. The objective should be to incorporate the
elements of alternative schools as regular institutional
features of the high school programs. There is, to be sure, a
great danger in rigid design of special programs for potential
high school dropouts. This restriction on student mobility,
however, is likely to be more than outweighed by the dread
ful consequences of simply ignoring such groups. Everyone
is now talking about the design of excellent high schools, by
which they mean better high schools for the better students. I
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am talking here about excellent programs in the high schools
for the lower tail of the achievement distribution.
2. What do the noncollege bound students need to learn in
high school? There is often a presumption that simple voca
tional skills are the best subjects for such students. There
seems to be ample evidence that the secondary vocational
education system, while more costly than other forms of
high school, does not generally provide long term earnings
gains for its graduates. Clerical and industrial education pro
grams do provide some short term earnings gains. What are
the sets of vocational skills taught most usefully in a
classroom setting and are there ways of increasing the effec
tiveness of such instruction? Can we identify general voca
tional skills that should be taught? Should we not also be
teaching young people reasoning and problemsolving skills?
Cognitive psychologists have been making considerable
strides in understanding how to teach such skills to young
people with relatively low IQs. Should such reasoning and
functional literacy skills be taught more and should out-ofschool youth also get such training? How can we encourage
mixtures of formal classroom training with on-the-job train
ing such as are found in the "dual system" of West Ger
many. While that system cannot easily be translated to the
United States because of substantially different traditions
and institutions, the cooperative education movement is,
perhaps, a viable model on which to build better educational
experiences for noncollege bound youth.
3. What do employers really want in their entry level
workers? It is my impression that upper level officers of
large companies say they want workers who are generally
trained and can therefore learn the specific skills required at
a firm. Lower-level supervisors, on the other hand, are
reputed to want workers who already know the specific skills
that are required. It would be useful to analyze what kinds of
skills are required and where those skills are best taught. We
cannot simply rely on the market to handle this problem
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because the schools have generally done a poor job of trying
to serve the poor students. Irrelevant instruction may explain
why dropping out is so common for some groups and places.
4. Job Corps needs to be continually monitored. It is the
most successful and unique of the American employment
and training programs for the severely disadvantaged and,
because its cost will always seem excessive to some, it is
necessary continually to be able to make the case that the
rate of return is high. It is also important to discover if that
rate of return should start to fall. We should also explore
how elements of the Job Corps program might be used in less
expensive programs of a nonresidential character. In my
view, Job Corps should be the centerpiece of the employ
ment and training system and it should be recognized as a
laboratory for design elements throughout the system.
Disadvantaged Adults
It has been the hope, particularly after the retargeting of
programs in the early 1960s, that employment and training
programs could raise the earnings of those workers whose
normal earnings were below subsistance. It was an alter
native to welfare. We now know from the negative income
tax experiments that creating work incentives under welfare
will be expensive because of the necessary adverse work in
centives for those formerly above the break-even level. That
means there is even more value to raising potential earnings
of the poor through effective employment and training pro
grams. Here are my candidates for research:
1. How can income transfer programs be better linked to
employment and training programs? It is clear that a simple
unified negative income tax is not desirable unless it is linked
with the adoption of a simple flat-rate tax—and I do not
consider that very feasible. Different groups should be sub
ject to different tax rates and income guarantees depending
on their family situation, employment prospects, etc.
Employment and training programs can have a place in such
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a design. For one thing, such programs can help select out
those who do not need labor market help. That has not been
a popular perspective in this country, though it appears to be
implicit in the programs of Sweden and some other coun
tries. I again mention the possibilities of sorting the long
term unemployed according to labor market attachment by
offering benefits (such as training or job subsidies) that can
ony be used in the labor market.
2. Why are job subsidies so ineffective despite the fact that
economists find them so desirable? We have learned that
employers do not respond much to employment incentives;
there are reasons one can imagine, including red tape, worry
about tax audits, certification by the government that those
receiving vouchers are "turkeys," etc. But we do not know
the answer, nor do we know if there are effective ways of
offsetting these defects. Job subsidies to be used in the public
or private sector ought to be the best way of doing targeted
job creation. We know it is not. Why? Can some ex
periments be devised to find out? While the Employment
Opportunity Pilot Project was poorly designed, the question
it was supposed to answer still remains.
3. Why did CETA and other programs seem to work bet
ter for women than for men? Is it that the women were of
higher quality because of sex descrimination in the labor
market or other reasons? Is their access to comparable op
portunities less? What does the answer imply about improv
ing the design of programs for women and for men? Are
there any useful interventions for adult men?
4. What is the relationship between low normal earnings
and physical and psychological health and what does the
linkage imply about the design of programs? A recent paper
by some Vanderbilt colleagues suggests that those with fewer
than eight years of formal education are three times as likely
as high school graduates to have common diseases including
cardiovascular, pulmonary, and musculoskeletal. 7 This
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would be one important mechanism linking low earnings be
tween periods in an individual's life. Low education is cor
related with low earnings. Is it a cause or effect of poor
health? Answering such questions requires new types of in
terdisciplinary research and an alliance between social and
biological sciences that has not been the norm in the past.
5. Is there addictive behavior being generated by human
resource programs as some conservatives suggest? Does
government help breed dependency and are there some types
of help that are more likely to breed the sort of independence
that most of us want program participants to achieve? The
question has not been taken seriously, but I believe it should
be. In more formal terms, it is a question about how far back
in the evolution of a person's career state dependency (in the
Markovian sense) persists. Sociologists have pioneered
methods for analyzing such problems using long panels of
data and it is an important and tractable issue. How big is
the effect and how can it be minimized?
6. Why is the serious bifurcation in the labor market for
blacks occurring and what, if anything, can employment and
training programs do about it? While earnings of young
educated blacks has been rising to parity with similar young
white cohorts, the relative earnings and income of less
educated blacks has been falling so that average income dif
ferentials between the races have stayed remarkably con
stant. Many less educated blacks are simply dropping out of
our statistics. Why? What are they doing? Are things getting
worse or do they have better alternatives? Has the type of
discrimination faced by blacks in the labor market become
quality discrimination (blacks have to be better than whites
to get similar jobs) or have education and training oppor
tunities been getting worse for blacks at the low end of the
distribution? Are new programs required and could some
planned variation or experiments be devised to identify bet
ter programs? A major effort needs to be undertaken to find
the equivalent of Job Corps for such disadvantaged adults.
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Perhaps an intelligent program of prevention should be put
in place and those who are too old should simply receive in
come transfers. That decision should not be made on the
basis of current knowledge.
Dislocated Workers
Experienced workers with good jobs have been laid off in
record numbers over the past four years and this has led to a
revival of the automation scare of the 1960s. I would hardly
deny that the economy has been undergoing change and that
we are moving closer to the day when no larger a share of the
workforce will be involved in manufacturing than is now in
volved in agriculture. However, I see no reason to panic
about the pace of change. Some readers may respond, "Of
course he sees no reason to panic, he is a tenured professor!"
This is not the place for detailed argument, but many recent
problems have been associated with the recession and many
will be eliminated by the recovery. It is simply too early to
tell whether, for example, the upper Midwest is in a serious
long term decline or whether it is suffering from the fact that
we have been using high interest rates to fight the inflation
for the past four years. The upper Midwest specializes in the
manufacture of interest-sensitive consumer durables. What
seems pretty clear from the research of the past decades is
that neither industry nor occupation is a good target for pro
grams designed to help dislocated workers. The dislocation
problems are most acute when individuals are not flexibly
trained and when an entire labor market deteriorates. For
dislocated workers, the following research topics should be
considered:
1. Can the impact of the computer be predicted from
analysis of the margins of change in the current economy?
There is a tendency to focus on the job-displacing conse
quences of the computer, but of course many jobs will be
created as well. Furthermore, the effects will be indirect.
Predicting the consequences of the invention and adoption
of the automobile by simply focusing on what happened to

66 A Research Agenda

horses and carriages now seems ridiculous to us. The
automobile changed our entire economy and society. So the
computer will allow the development of custom production
where scale economies become less and less important. This
means more people will be engaged in the design and
matching of products to uses. What does all this imply about
the retraining of workers and about the education of new en
trants into the labor force? What general skills should high
schools teach for labor market careers in excess of 50 years in
such a new environment?
2. Under what circumstances are retraining programs ef
fective for dislocated workers? Are retraining programs bet
ter for women than men because they have more restricted
mobility in our society and retraining might compensate for
immobility? How does mobility relate to the design of
retraining? The early results from the Down River
demonstrations indicate poor results for retraining pro
grams, though experimental evidence would be more per
suasive on the matter. What other programs need to be link
ed together for long term dislocated workers? For example,
are there regional development efforts that can be facilitated
by retraining, or is that a strategy for which troubled regions
have no comparative advantage over growing regions like the
Sun Belt?
3. Can incentives be designed and tested experimentally so
that firms considering plant closings can help their
employees find other jobs more quickly? Either tax advan
tages or the employment of plant managers as consultants in
the placement process might be worth trying. Could incen
tives for early warning of at-risk workers be provided? There
is now a high level of strategy involved in the negotiations
with workers in such circumstances and the game may well
be a prisoner's dilemma where some social intervention
would make both parties better off.
4. Can labor market adjustment be aided by facilitating
the flow of information on vacancies and job seekers? The
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real estate industry has managed to keep the matching of
buyers and sellers private while collectively sharing informa
tion through multiple listings. Could something along those
lines be developed for the labor market? Anyone who has
observed the job-matching by computer available in Sweden
cannot fail to be impressed. Of course, Sweden is smaller
and the public job service controls the market, but it is also
true that they got the idea from experiments in Texas. This
might be a service that could become self-financing after
awhile.
5. For those workers who become long term unemployed,
are there ways of giving assistance that will speed the labor
market adjustment process? Experiments with alternative
employment and training vouchers for training, job sub
sidies, relocation assistance, and other devices might identify
mechanisms with fewer long term disincentives than those
found under our typical readjustment assistance programs
developed in the 1970s.
Older Workers in Distress
As workers age, they become increasingly attached to par
ticular firms and dislocation results in longer duration
unemployment. For many, health and related problems sug
gest that the best solution is retirement. But with increasing
life expectancy, employment and training programs could
have a 15 year pay-back period for a 55 year old worker.
With an aging population and a need to raise the retirement
age, this population will become an increasing focus of
employment and training efforts. Society will increasingly
face decisions about who should and who should not have to
work. My candidates for research include:
1. What are the impediments to part-time employment for
older workers and can something be done to reduce them?
Fixed fringe benefits can make part-time employees quite
unattractive. Can ways be found for the government to take
over some of these and for employees to share more of the
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costs and benefits of such schemes? Would that reduce
transfer costs by increasing labor supply?
2. Will age discrimination statutes that are easiest to en
force on firings cause the locus of any age discrimination to
shift to hiring? Is it generally becoming harder to get rid of
bad employees and does that work to the detriment of hiring
older workers? The answers to this might require some
detailed analysis of employer behavior under different rules
of seniority.
3. Can planned variation or experiments be devised to
figure out the most effective employment and training in
terventions for older workers? Should special programs be
designed for them or can such people be well-served in ex
isting programs as some recent evidence suggests?

How Should the System be Organized?
It should be no surprise, but research seems to have had
less impact on the design of the delivery system than on any
other component of employment and training policy.
Research on delivery system issues is the most potentially
threatening activity from the viewpoint of the policymaker.
Yet research might inform the ideological debates and there
are some topics that I would consider prime candidates for
research.
I cannot resist one remark about delivery systems and our
experience over the past two decades. Since the early 1970s,
the system has moved increasingly to a decentralized design
with states receiving increasing authority. Only one part of
the system was exempted from the perpetual commotion
associated with reform of the system and that was Job
Corps. It is federally operated by subcontractors who are
held to standards that are generally well-regarded. And it is
this part of the system that has had the most consistent suc
cess with the most difficult population: severely disadvantaged youth. Someone less familiar with the politics of employ-
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ment and training programs might ask why Job Corps is not
the model of an effective delivery system for helping distress
ed workers.
There are four research questions I would suggest:
1. What is the best mix of formal statistical evaluation
techniques and of institutional control mechanisms to assure
an effective system? A promising research strategy would in
volve collaboration of political scientists and economists on
comparative studies across countries. Sweden and Germany
are generally reputed to have high quality systems. They sub
ject themselves to little formal evaluation and so there is little
evidence on their systems' effectiveness. On the other hand,
they have created institutional arrangements and govern
ment mechanisms that reinforce standards and relevance of
training and they have established a highly professional
system. We have generally failed to do that, though there are
some examples of outstanding programs in particular places
in the U.S. Both formal evaluation and good institutions are
essential. We need research on how to design those institu
tions for the particular local environments in the U.S.
2. It is now understood that in the absence of controlled
experiments, it is only by modeling the selection of program
participants and the goals of program operators that we can
identify the impact of programs. From my point of view,
formalizing the selection would help in evaluation. In fact, if
selection were done by an examination (and the ironic result
is that the worse the test, the easier it is to be confident of the
estimates of treatment effects) then we could improve
evaluation of alternative programs. If we cannot do random
assignments, then we ought to consider selection tests. But
we also need to understand selection issues because they are
important in their own right. The government is interested in
these programs in order to offset market failure and to pro
vide new employment opportunities to workers whom
employers have not especially wanted. Employers, on the
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other hand, want the best workers they can find. As we have
shifted the balance of the system toward business control,
the likelihood of creaming will increase. That may make the
programs look better to the unsophisticated, but it will make
the system less effective as a remedial device. That means
that research on selection becomes one of the key points of
inquiry about how the new JTPA system is working.
3. One of the ideological solutions to program deficiencies
under the current administration is to convert competitive or
monitored programs into general block grants to states. To
my way of thinking, that will generate less efficiency. The
competitive pressures and the oversight will be removed.
Others argue, however, that local responsibility will more
than offset such effects. This is a researchable question for
the sort of methodology pioneered by Richard Nathan and it
should be explored further.
4. Finally, we need to explore better linkages of finance
and delivery, especially in conducting industrial policy. If we
have to target aid to particular industries, I would argue that
we should tax those same industries in the long run to pay for
the benefits. Once that is done, I frankly do not care what
the aid consists of. The rise and fall of the British Industrial
Training Boards can provide a good deal of insight on this
approach. The point is that we need to figure out how to link
the financing of employment and training and other pro
grams with the benefits and the costs. User fees might im
prove programs as well as relieve tight budgets. I have
argued that user fees could be a great source of improvement
for the Job Service and the principle ought to apply
elsewhere.

Conclusion
While research budgets for employment and training, like
the programs themselves, have been reduced substantially,
there are certainly many issues that could profitably be
studied. The first priority of the Labor Department ought to
be data collection. In a more decentralized system, the ac-
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quisition of data on outcomes, processes, and selection
becomes essential if we are to know if the system is any good
and if we are to improve the system.
Beyond that, I have listed a variety of research topics re
quiring closing the research loop to help in finding new
answers rather than just in recertifying old problems. There
is simply too much specialization in our research. Rigorous
research across several activities and disciplines could have
large payoff. But that requires coordination and leadership.
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An Administrator's
Reflections
Howard Rosen
Few former federal career employees are even invited to
come out of the closet of bureaucratic anonymity to reflect
on programs they have administered. I immodestly accepted
this invitation to discuss what I experienced and learned as
the Director of the Office of Research and Development in
the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Ad
ministration between 1962 and 1980 because I believe that
my observations might be of interest not only to labor
economists but also to students of public administration.
Let me begin by making some general comments about im
portant differences controlling administration in the public
and private sectors. Public administrators are controlled by a
law, many laws or regulations. Legalism in general, and laws
in particular, tend to circumscribe and influence the opera
tion of publicly administered programs more so than in the
private sector. Administrators of private programs are told
by law what they cannot do. The law tells the administrators
of public programs what they can do. This is a subtle but im
portant difference affecting decisions and freedom to act.
A second important difference is the goldfish bowl en
vironment of life in Washington. In addition to perpetual
scrutiny, public administrators are held to far higher ethical
73
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and moral standards than those found in the private sector.
On top of these restraints, career public administrators must
maintain a neutrality and professionalism not often required
in private industry.
In spite of the laws, regulations and ethical standards,
public administrators are expected to be effective and per
form assignments. It is my belief that administrators of
government programs must be more creative, imaginative
and resourceful than their counterparts in private industry if
they are to achieve program objectives.
The Department of Labor's Employment and Training
Administration (ETA) program was conducted during 18
years of turmoil, change and national unrest. During the
1962-80 period the country was involved in two military wars
and one massive social and economic war against poverty.
The Research and Development program was conducted
through recessions, inflation, race riots, and active civil
rights movement leading to growth in minority power and oil
price shocks.
The economy changed and required new and different
skills from our workforce. The share of manufacturing jobs
declined from about 30 to 20 percent of total employment.
Service industry employment rose from 14 to 20 percent of
all jobs and the proportion of employees working for state
and local governments increased from 12 to 15 percent of
total employment. Despite the unprecedented entry of in
creasing numbers of young workers into the labor force and
a 50 percent increase in our workforce, the country suffered
no massive unemployment.
A social revolution was also changing the labor force par
ticipation of women. While the participation rate for men
declined in every age group between the ages of 20 to 64, the
rates for women increased in every age cohort. Child rearing
no longer forced most women out of the labor force. Be-
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tween 1962 and 1980, the labor force participation rate for
women with children under the age of six more than doubled
and the number of families headed by women also rose from
4.5 to 9.0 million.
The ETA social science research program was established
under Title I of the Manpower Development and Training
Act (MDTA) of 1962, continued under the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973, and extend
ed under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982.
The Manpower Act was passed primarily in order to offset
the displacement effects of automation and technological
changes in workers. During the 1960 presidential campaign,
Senator Kennedy was exposed to the large number of
unemployed West Virginia coal miners who had lost their
jobs because of the shifts to diesel locomotives and the
greater use of oil and other sources of energy than coal. He
promised the people of West Virginia that, if elected presi
dent, he would try to assist them. He carried out his promise
with manpower legislation which proposed to train and
retrain workers who were unemployed because of automa
tion and technological changes.
Those of us who participated in writing some sections of
what eventually became the Manpower Act experienced the
wondrous and mysterious ways of how legislation is
prepared. At first, there was a period of intense and furious
work. Our respective contributions were then collected and
we never saw what the legislation looked like until it surfaced
as the proposed Manpower Act. We never heard about, nor
were we a party to, the negotiations as the proposed legisla
tion drifted through the various agencies which were to par
ticipate in its implementation. Once the bill appeared on the
Hill we were reactivated again to write speeches for cabinet
officers and legislators during the hearings and congressional
debates.
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Before and after the Manpower Act was passed there was
considerable contact with Swedish government officials who
described their "active manpower policy" to U.S.
policymakers. Under this philosophy, the Swedish govern
ment was no longer a neutral observer of developments af
fecting its workforce. Unemployment, industrial shifts and
labor market operations were now a concern of the govern
ment. Some, but not all, of the Swedish thinking was
adopted by those involved in the development of a U.S.
manpower policy during the early 1960s.
Title I of the Manpower Act called for a research program
that differed quite radically from those then being conducted
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and other com
ponents of the Department of Labor. For decades, BLS had
collected information contributing to our fund of knowledge
about the employment and unemployment of American
workers. It also collected data on wages, prices and produc
tivity. The Bureau was not expected to be concerned with
policy-oriented research. Under the Manpower Act, the
Department was now directed to collect information that
could shape policy and programs. We were also given the op
portunity to develop and test, in operational situations, ways
in which manpower programs might more effectively meet
significant manpower problems.
The new legislation called for a research program that con
tributed to policies that would result in solutions of the prob
lems created by ". . . changes in the structure of production
and demand in the use of the Nation's human resources." 1
The research office, which was created under Title I of
MDTA, was allocated $2.8 million per year between 1962
and 1970 to study, in addition to automation, the practices
of employers and unions which impede the mobility of
workers, appraise the adequacy of the nation's manpower
development efforts and recommend programs for untrained
and inexperienced youth. Armed with the imprecise and am-
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biguous language of the Manpower Act, we marched off to
war to do away with unemployment and its causes.
Once the law was passed we discovered that it is far easier
to write legislation than it is to translate legislative language
into programs. An apprehensive group of federal employees
met in Seymour Wolfbein's office on March 16, 1962, the
day after President Kennedy signed the law. 2 To counter the
perennial criticism of the underworked government
employee, it should be documented that we worked an
average of 10 to 12 hours a day for 7 days a week for a full
year in order to launch the training and retraining programs.
Substantive work was conducted on Saturdays and Sundays
when the telephone switchboard was closed. The initial plans
for a research program were developed in between hundreds
of telephone calls and numerous speeches given around the
country. The first year was a true test of our physical
stamina and emotional stability.
In order to put a publicly administered research program
in proper context, it may be helpful to discuss both the inter
nal and external environment which influenced and affected
some of our decisions and programs.

Internal Environment
Much has been written about the relationship between
political appointees and career government employees. Each
president can bring in to his administration 2,500 new ap
pointees. The job qualifications of these policymakers and
knowledge of the programs they administer may vary con
siderably. There is always an uncomfortable period of
testing that goes on between political appointees and career
employees until mutual respect and trust is developed. The
research office seems to have survived a succession of
policymakers by demonstrating its ability to contribute its
knowledge to the needs of a variety of policymakers.
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The management staff of ETA, consisting of career
federal employees, was a problem of another sort. The
budget responsibilities and oversight authority of the pro
curement process of the management personnel enabled
them to exert considerable power over our activities. We had
frequent disputes with the management people because of
their lack of understanding of social science research and
their distrust of social scientists. Most of the previous ex
perience of the management staff had been limited to the
purchase of desks, chairs and other supplies and equipment.
We sought a flexibility in our work with social researchers
that was foreign to their way of thinking. Until we
demonstrated our usefulness to the political appointees and
the operating managers of ETA's programs, our research
budget was considered fair game for purposes other than
research by the management personnel
Another group which contributed to a hostile environment
for a research program in a mission-oriented agency was the
administrators of programs such as Unemployment In
surance, the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training (BAT)
and the operators of training and retraining activities.
Our challenge was to persuade some of these ad
ministrators that a research program could be useful to
them. We needed their cooperation because their programs
were relevant to our mission. Furthermore, if they par
ticipated in decisions on research projects they might be
more inclined to utilize our findings in their programs.
We finally worked out a strategy that proved most effec
tive. After our annual budget increased from $2.8 to $13.0
million in 1970, we set aside a fixed sum of money that was
to be used for research and development purposes for each
operating component of the Employment and Training Ad
ministration. We used committees, consisting of represen
tatives of the research office and operating agencies, to
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review and make decisions about research projects relevant
to their missions. We learned that money is an effective tool
for winning friends in the public sector of the economy.
Some examples of committee-sponsored research included
an assessment of the counseling service of the Employment
Service and a study of how the productivity of local employ
ment offices could be improved. The committee also spon
sored an examination of the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles to determine its usefulness and its users. Although
money was effective in reducing some of the hostility to
research, we had recurrent problems in trying to persuade
our peers that we were not about to invade their jurisdic
tions.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics was another organization
that had to be assured that we were not taking over their
functions. Again, money and strategy helped to ease ten
sions. As indicated earlier, the Manpower Act directed us to
appraise the adequacy of the nation* s manpower develop
ment efforts to meet foreseeable needs for workers. We ask
ed the Bureau of Labor Statistics to conduct a pioneering
survey of how American workers acquired training for their
jobs. 3 This study both eased our relations with BLS and gave
the country its first view of the extent of job training in the
U.S.
Our one major conflict with BLS took place over their
reluctance to reassess their data collection system in urban
centers. We had supported the work of anthropologists who
lived in ghetto areas. They reported that many minority
workers had become discouraged and dropped out of the
labor market. In their view, BLS surveys did not correctly
measure the extent of unemployment in ghetto areas. Even
tually, BLS was persuaded to examine the problem of undercounting which led to a new data series on unemployment in
central cities.
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The final point about our internal environment concerns
our experience with the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Train
ing. In reviewing our mandate to collect information about
the training of American workers, it became obvious that
although the apprenticeship system trained a relatively small
number of craftsmen, it played a significant role in preparing
some of the country's most skilled workers. The close rela
tions of the personnel of BAT with the unions made it dif
ficult to conduct any research that might appear in any way
to loosen the trade unions' control of a training system that
affected the supply of workers.
In order to learn more about the apprenticeship system
and to conduct studies to modernize it we devised a strategy
that would avoid a confrontation with either BAT personnel
or the unions. Our plan called for the development of a
model apprenticeship program that could be used as a com
parison by unions and employers now conducting programs.
We proposed a new system for realistically determining the
number of hours required for learning the plumber and
pipefitter trade.
We asked Dr. John Dunlop of Harvard, who was trusted
and respected by union leaders, to review our plan and, if it
proved acceptable to him, to use his negotiating skills to per
suade the unions to go along with our proposed study. After
he approved our approach, he encouraged trade union
leaders to participate in the preparation of a model appren
ticeship program which was developed at Purdue University.
The results of the study were published in a series of
monographs which were widely distributed and contributed
to the modernization of some apprenticeship programs.
To sum up our internal environment problems, we suc
ceeded in having research and development accepted in a
mission-oriented agency only after we demonstrated the
usefulness of our findings. Research could be conducted if
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we avoided face-to-face confrontations and developed
strategies that would not directly challenge programs or
jurisdictions. Money was helpful, but the committee system
which involved the potential users of research was also effec
tive in developing cooperative working relationships. Final
ly, knowledge of institutional politics and access to persons
who could help us to achieve our objectives proved to be of
inestimable value.

The External Environment
The most important component of our external environ
ment was the research community. We were launching a pro
gram that required researchers who were interested in prob
lems of unemployment, underemployment, labor market
operations, discrimination, skill training and the special dif
ficulties faced by the "economically disadvantaged" of our
society. In surveying the literature of the early and
mid-1960s, we were struck by the small number of scholars
who were studying the problems specified by MDTA and its
amendments. Most of the social scientists whose
backgrounds and experience were remotely related to our
subjects of interest were studying unions, collective bargain
ing, wages, etc. Columbia University's Conservation of
Human Resources, under Dr. Eli Ginzberg's direction, was
the only on-going institution concerned with labor market
issues relevant to our mission.
In examining the early proposals submitted to our office
we concluded that we were suffering from a "tired blood"
syndrome in that so few young researchers appeared to be in
terested in studying the issues which concerned us. In an ef
fort to attract new researchers we first broadcast, through a
variety of channels, our interest in supporting research on a
specified list of employment and training problems. We were
overwhelmed with proposals that seemed to come primarily
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from persons or organizations with little or no research
background.
Dr. Ginzberg, in discussing our experience with us, sug
gested that we produce our own experts. This led us to start a
doctoral dissertation program which proved to be one of our
most significant long term accomplishments. Many of the
country's leading social scientists now working on employ
ment and training issues were able to get their Ph.D.s
through this program. 4
During the early years we primarily used unsolicited pro
posals and sole source awards in order to secure research per
formers. We often sought out specialists who were studying
subjects relevant to our program needs. Once our budget in
creased and we could be involved in more costly research and
development efforts, we made greater use of Requests for
Proposals (RFPs). We tried, however, to maintain a balance
between unsolicited proposals and RFPs because we always
wanted to have access to the talents of the academic com
munity. RFP procurements appeared to attract few college
professors because they were not able to match the grantsmanship capability of the consulting firms.
About two-thirds of the proposals submitted were re
jected. Ninety percent of the unsolicited proposals were turn
ed down. We were constantly winnowing not only the pro
posals but also the researchers. We had to distinguish be
tween scholars who appeared to be only concerned with fur
thering their disciplines and those who were genuinely in
terested in social and economic problems. Many of the
researchers who were caught in the publish or perish syn
drome submitted proposals that were more directed toward
furthering their reputations than in making contributions to
our knowledge about the social and economic issues iden
tified in MDTA. We found very few scholars or consulting
organizations able to assist us in getting research findings
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utilized or interested in following through in having their
studies used for policy decisions.
There was, and still is, a real shortage of social scientists
capable of combining their research background with the
very practical real world problems of organizing and con
ducting experimental and demonstration projects with
rigorous research designs. Few, if any, of our training in
stitutions appear to have recognized the need for researchers
who can both apply scientific research methods and carry
out the necessary nitty-gritty chores required for establishing
small-scale experimental and demonstration projects which
can tell policymakers whether large-scale programs are feasi
ble or desirable.
One of the key factors affecting the success or failure of a
research and development program is the review process.
Before we made a decision on which review method to use,
we consulted with several research offices in federal agen
cies. After prolonged and frank discussions with some of the
administrators who established the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) we decided not to use peer review of proposals
by nongovernmental panels of experts. Although this system
was in use at NIH, we were advised that if they were starting
all over again, some of these administrators would no longer
use this system. Their view was that peer review too often
ends up in an "old boy" system of mutual back-scratching.
They also believed that new young researchers and in
novators found it more difficult to break into the funding
circle controlled by more established scientists. We settled on
a review system which included staff assessment and exten
sive examination by specialists in the federal government as
well as by nongovernmental experts.
No honest account of a research and development ad
ministrator's reflections could possibly exclude reference to
the real world of political pressures that pervade the very air
of Washington. Let me start with the flat assertion that I was
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always surprised by how little pressure was exerted on us to
fund performers who came through the political route.
Ninety-nine percent of the products we funded were based
on our decisions rather than those imposed by political ap
pointees. If there is credit or blame to be given for success or
failure of this particular research and development effort, it
should be directed to the career staff who administered the
program.
This does not say that efforts were not made to secure
funding through the political route. Most of these proposals
were fended off by our normal review process. Remember
that our office rejected at least 90 percent of unsolicited pro
posals. Upon occasion, in order to take heat off career
employees, we would convene ad hoc panels of well-known
social scientists to review a proposal in which either the
White House or a congressman had indicated more than
casual interest. After this review, we were usually able to in
form the applicants and their sponsors how a panel of na
tionally known experts had voted.
There seemed to be little difference in the amount of
pressure exerted by either of the two major parties. We
learned that, for the most part, bona fide researchers did not
apply for funding through the political route. We identified
pressure as proposals forwarded by the White House or sent
to us by senators or representatives. It was relatively easy to
distinguish between proposals that were transmitted as a
matter of routine courtesy to constituents from those in
which there was a genuine interest.
Congressional oversight of our program was minimal. The
Office of Management and Budget's annual review was
primarily an educational activity to apprise the examiners
and analysts of our findings and major funding. We had two
experiences with the General Accounting Office (GAO). In
the first instance we were advised that GAO was prepared to
launch a major study of how we used our research products.

An Administrator's Reflections 85

After spending two hours explaining that we had established
a separate division just to concentrate on the utilization of
research and development findings and specifying how this
activity was being conducted, the representatives of GAO
quietly left and never returned. We were visited a second
time by the GAO for an examination of our procurement ac
tivities. After an exhaustive survey they tapped us on the
wrist by pointing out that some of our files were incomplete
in that all necessary documents were not immediately
available.
We had one experience with the donor of the Golden
Fleece Award. For several years we had been conducting a
series of studies and small-scale research demonstration pro
jects to determine whether income assistance might reduce
recidivism among ex-offenders. We were interested in the
employment experience of ex-offenders because one out of
two clients in the manpower programs had either arrest or in
carceration records. Local, state and federal correctional in
stitutions were releasing prisoners to the outside world with
sums of money that varied from 25 cents to $50 or just a suit
of clothes. Our earliest research indicated that most exoffenders would have to depend on the weak reed of friends
or relatives for income support after they left prison.
After years of careful documentation and review of our in
itial review and experimental and demonstration efforts by a
panel of penologists, we decided to conduct an experiment in
Georgia and Texas to determine whether unemployment in
surance might reduce the recidivism rate of released
prisoners. Shortly after the project began a Georgia
newspaperman called Senator Proxmire's office to advise a
member of his staff that the Department of Labor was fund
ing a project which gave money to "pimps, rapists and
murderers." We were immediately called and asked to sub
mit a description of our project to the Senator.
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We forwarded the requested material which described the
experimental design, our years of study, and the rationale
for the work. We also pointed out that Dr. Peter Rossi,
former president of the American Sociological Association,
was chief researcher and that the project was being supervis
ed by the American Bar Association. We waited a few days
before calling the Senator's assistant, who was most pleasant
to us. He complimented us so highly on our rigorous design
and professional research that I was moved to ask whether
the Senator might want to consider the project for a Dia
mond Fleece Award as an exemplary government research
project. I was told that I was overstepping my bounds and
the conversation was abruptly terminated. That was the last I
heard from this type of senatorial oversight.
To summarize our external environment, we created a
research community of scholars interested in employment
and training issues by launching a doctoral dissertation pro
gram which proved to be very helpful in encouraging young
scholars to study labor market operations. We tried to main
tain a balanced procurement process which left the door
open so that we were exposed to new and innovative ideas
and researchers. We were constantly searching for research
ers who were concerned with the impact of their studies on
policy issues. We found very few social scientists who could
develop a good research design and translate it into a real
world experimental or demonstration project. Apparently,
our proposal review process effectively minimized political
pressure on career employees.

Research Strategy
The primary motive for passage of the Manpower Act was
to provide training and retraining in order to ameliorate the
effects of automation and technological changes on
unemployed workers who previously had a relatively strong
attachment to the labor market. These were the white blue-
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collar workers whom Senator Kennedy had seen during his
presidential campaign in West Virginia. In addition to
automation, the act directed us to discover why shortages of
qualified personnel existed even during periods of high
unemployment. We were also expected to identify areas of
current and prospective manpower shortages and to report
on occupations which promised reasonable expectations of
employment and on-the-job training opportunities for
trainees who participated in government sponsored training
programs.
Shortly after the legislation was passed, students of labor
market changes noted that despite all of the talk about
automation, unemployment was declining and the number
of employed workers was increasing. Between 1962 and
1965, the rate of unemployment dropped from 5.5 to 4.5 per
cent and employment rose by 4.3 million from 66.7 to 71.0
million. Other researchers also reported that the automation
of the early and mid-1960s was not about to wipe out
millions of jobs and leave us with mechanized factories that
would displace millions of workers.
Some students of the American economy alerted the coun
try to the growing number of unskilled and poorly educated
workers who could benefit from training and retraining. Our
office conducted a survey for President Kennedy's Task
Force on Manpower Conservation which was published with
the nostalgic title of One-Third of a Nation. This report
documented that one-half of the young men called for preinduction examination under Selective Service were found un
qualified for military service. 5 Fully one-third of the age
group did not meet the required standards of health and
education. Our survey also showed that a major proportion
of these young men were the products of poverty that they
inherited from their parents and unless the skills of the re
jectees were upgraded, these young men would face a
lifetime of recurrent unemployment.
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The labor force data, White House memoranda, popular
articles and books on poverty, One-Third of a Nation, all
contributed to a major shift in manpower policy from con
centration on workers displaced by automation to
economically disadvantaged workers and youths. By the end
of the Kennedy Administration and the beginning of the
Johnson presidency, manpower policy had moved to the war
on poverty.
Developing a meaningful and coherent research strategy
for a social science program in a federal agency proved to be
a real challenge. Annual budgets, a constantly shifting group
of political appointees, changes in priorities and the need of
policymakers for immediate answers to complex issues made
it difficult to plan for a long term program. We were acutely
aware that social science research was more capable of pro
viding information than solutions to complex and deeprooted economic and social problems. For this reason, we
could not over promise results to political managers who
wanted clear cut unambiguous research findings which could
be used for making decisions.
In order to survive, our research strategy called for two
levels of projects. Realistically, we knew that a research
organization in a mission-oriented federal agency must put
aside a certain proportion of its resources for what can be
described as "quick and dirty" research. This research was
designed to give political appointees and other ad
ministrators information that could be used for making cur
rent policy decisions.
The second type of research, which we believed was more
suitable to social science research capabilities, was directed
toward the cumulative acquisition of information about ma
jor employment and training problems. One of the most im
portant lessons we learned in administering the research and
development programs is that ad hoc and unrelated projects
do not, for the most part, have as great an impact as
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cumulative research on major social and economic issues.
Those of us who started ETA's research and development
program soon came to the realization that social science
research is more comparable to the slow, long term ac
cumulation of information about cancer than the discovery
and immediate application of the Salk vaccine leading to the
sudden disappearance of infantile paralysis.
The best example of an investment in basic and long term
research was our support for a national longitudinal survey
of 20,000 workers which began in the mid-1960s and is still
continuing in 1984. The data of the labor market experience
of 20,000 workers representing the American labor force in
four broad age categories are collected by the Census
Bureau. The National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) data in
clude information on employment and unemployment ex
perience, occupational training, aspirations, education,
health, family backgrounds and exposure to counseling. The
cumulative data base of the NLS is now one of the nation's
most important sources of information on the work ex
perience of American workers. The findings of the NLS have
had an impact on legislation, programs and policy decisions.
They have been analyzed and used by scholars in hundreds
of articles, monographs and books.
Another example of long term support was the study of
the effects of occupational licensing on the employment op
portunities of nonprofessional workers. 6 After a 1967 survey
of state and local licensing laws which set the groundwork
for further exploration, we embarked on a series of studies
and action programs which continued through 1980. In
order to remove the barriers of occupational licensing to
employment, we funded the researcher to become a "change
agent" to testify before local political leaders and state
legislators so that they would know how to draw up more
equitable licensing laws. He was consulted extensively by
persons concerned with improving occupational licensing
laws throughout the United States.
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In addition to recognizing the benefits of cumulative
research we also learned that the social and economic prob
lems we studied rarely fit neatly into any single social science
discipline. Cultural differences, motivation, education,
training, health and discrimination were just some of the
reasons workers experienced difficulty in the labor market.
Our clients had problems which cut across several disciplines
rather than any single one. For this reason, we made a
deliberate effort to involve sociologists, anthropologists,
psychologists, demographers, political scientists, and other
social scientists in our research program. We also sought out
social scientists who were capable of interdisciplinary
research.
In developing our research agenda we followed a practice
of specifying major issues and problems. We then asked the
research staff to articulate a number of researchable and in
tegrated questions that could be explored and lead to a
cumulative base of information. We then sought scholars
who may have already started studying some of the issues or
tried to persuade others to direct their research skills to the
economic and social problems of concern to us. We often
followed and supported these peripatetic scholars who were
willing to make long term commitments to subjects of in
terest to the research and development program, as they
moved from university to university.
As one would expect, we were originally inundated with
proposals to study the effect of automation and
technological changes on skill requirements and employ
ment. We had the difficult task of separating charlatans
from legitimate researchers. We discovered that there was a
cadre of social scientists who were willing to devote their
careers to following newspaper headlines in order to study
"popular" subjects. Many of these researchers suffered
from a reverse of the Midas principle. Wherever there was
gold, they wanted to touch it.
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After the shift in policy and priorities from automation to
concentration on the problems of the economically disadvantaged, we decided that studies of labor market operations
would be the basic foundation of our research strategy. We
then went on to support research that examined institutional
obstacles that some workers faced in entering and maneuver
ing through the labor market. In addition to studies of
employers' hiring practices, occupational licensing and job
market information, we supported research which examined
the special employment problems of blacks, Hispanics,
women, youth, older workers, ex-offenders and migrant
workers.
In order to broaden the research strategy, some of the
country's leading social scientists were first invited to join a
committee to advise the research office on future program
directions. Because members came from different
disciplines, it was sometimes difficult to secure agreement on
subjects for studies or research methodologies. Eventually,
the committee was discontinued and greater dependence was
placed on staff-originated proposals, unsolicited proposals
and suggestions forwarded by the operating, planning and
policy staffs.
As a result of the merger, in 1970, of the Office of Special
Manpower Projects and the research office, the new annual
research and development budget increased from $2.8 to
$13.0 million. This larger budget enabled the office to now
support experimental and demonstration projects in addition
to conventional research. We hoped that these small scale ex
perimental and demonstration projects could now be used to
test the feasibility of new concepts and programs before
moving to large national efforts.
The Office of Special Manpower Projects originally was
assigned to support experimental and demonstration efforts
during the 1960s. These projects were operated primarily as
catalysts for social action, with the formal generation of in-
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formation and insight regarding operational problems as an
important, but subsidiary, concern. The new combined Of
fice of Research and Development (ORD) adopted a policy
that research had to be an integral component of all ex
perimental and demonstration projects. The operators of
experimental and demonstration projects who were primari
ly oriented to provide services to clients also had to be per
suaded to cooperate with researchers who were studying
their programs.
We soon discovered that "carrying out any social experi
ment successfully is a managerial tour de force. . . ." 7 Our
largest investment in a demonstration research project with a
randomized experimental control group was Supported
Work which was a 5-year effort to test whether individuals
with severe employment problems could be made
employable by exposing them to a controlled work ex
perience. The demonstration research project proved most
effective in preparing for employment a substantial number
of women who had been on welfare (AFDC) for many years.
The program also had an impact on a significant segment of
the study's ex-addict population. There was only a marginal
effect on ex-offenders who did not show less criminal
behavior and whose rate of employment and earnings were
only slightly better than a control group of ex-offenders.
Neither was there any long term positive results for the
youths in the demonstration project.
A second random experimental control project, which
coincidentally also offered services to female heads of
households in AFDC, involved an effort to move women on
welfare from the secondary to the primary labor market so
that they could become self-supporting. Welfare mothers
were entered in selected training institutions that offered
tightly structured instructional formats, remedial education
and a proven record of placing graduates in expanding oc
cupations with starting wages of more than $9,000 per year.
We learned that it was possible to make a certain proportion
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of women on welfare self-supporting. The results indicated
that a significant investment in training, remedial education
and supportive services could overcome the destructiveness
of poverty, poor education and discrimination for some
women on AFDC. 8
In summing up our experience in developing and main
taining a research strategy in a mission-oriented federal
agency, it is worth noting that missions are subject to change
even without new legislation. For example, the concept of
"economically disadvantaged" was not articulated in the
laws controlling our programs until the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973. The
spillover of the war against poverty, which pervaded the
government during the 1960s, contributed to the change of
the direction of the employment and training program.
As indicated earlier, administrators of federal research
and development programs, if they are to survive, must be
responsive to the immediate needs of political appointees
and be prepared to support short term research that might be
useful for current policy decisions. Although cumulative,
long term information-building research seems to provide
more valid findings than some ad hoc research, it is far more
difficult to introduce and maintain in a federal environment
oriented to annual budgets and quick and easy solutions of
enormously complex problems.
The deep-rooted causes of unemployment, discrimination
and other factors handicapping workers rarely match single
social science research disciplines. For this reason, inter
disciplinary research efforts and more cooperation among
federal agencies are needed to explore social and economic
problems assigned to the government. Finally, in spite of the
difficulties in managing experimental and demonstration
projects and their other limitations, greater effort should be
made to test small scale exploratory projects before launch
ing major national large scale programs.
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Policy: The Evanescent Goal
Government decisions affecting policies or courses of ac
tion are generally not traceable to a clearly demarcated
event. Instead, they are more likely to be part of a slow, inef
ficient and haphazard process. Unfortunately, research find
ings are rarely available at the exact moment they are needed
in making policy decisions. Furthermore, many research
studies produce ambiguous results at a time when a decisionmaker seeks clear-cut findings. Because of timing and am
biguity problems, social science research can primarily con
tribute enlightenment rather than solutions to the
policymaking process. Notwithstanding the inherent dif
ficulties associated with social research, administrators of
federal research and development programs are regularly
challenged by newly appointed political officeholders with
the question, "What impact has your program had on
policy?"
In assessing the effect of ETA's research and development
program on policy decisions, it is well to keep in mind that
between 1962 and 1980, the Department of Labor had eight
secretaries and five assistant secretaries responsible for ad
ministering employment and training programs. One could
reply to the previous question with another question,
"Whose policy?" Not only did the top personnel change
quite often, but so did the policy direction of the program.
As noted earlier, program concentration shifted from
workers affected by automation to economically disadvantaged workers. The system of delivery of services changed
drastically between MDTA and CETA from centralized
delivery to decentralization. New deliverers of service known
as Prime Sponsors were introduced. In addition, public
employment programs were introduced in the 1973 legisla
tion and the responsibility for providing services to special
target groups such as youth, offenders, persons of limited
English-speaking ability and older workers was assigned to
the federal government.
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The combination of the number of political appointees,
their rapid turnover and short term orientation as well as ma
jor shifts in priorities and philosophy compounded the job
of a research administrator interested in developing a
coherent, cumulative, long term program that could con
tribute to policy decisions. We soon learned that most
political appointees are not interested in funding projects
that will deliver findings long after they have left office.
Our experience in trying to introduce policy issues in the
President's Manpower Report (also known as the Employ
ment and Training Report of the President) is worth noting.
We were constantly criticized because this report, which was
our responsibility, was not used as a vehicle for introducing
new significant policy issues. In response to this criticism, we
attempted to introduce policy issues which we thought could
be agreed upon by the review process. We discovered that
unilaterally originated policy was shot down in the extensive
interagency review process. Each reviewer refused to accept
responsibility for approving a policy that had not been
previously agreed upon by his political superior. It became
obvious that this was the wrong way to introduce policy
issues. In order to bring new employment and training policy
issues to the fore it would have been first necessary to secure
agreement from cabinet officers and then use the report
route. We decided that it was not worth the time and effort
and were content to let the report simply describe programs
and provide data on labor force, employment and
unemployment, hours, earnings and turnover.
In addition to a very active publishing program which pro
duced dozens of monographs summarizing what we learned
from research and development projects, we devised several
tactics for bringing current research findings to the attention
of policymakers so that they could be used in the decisionmaking process. One device which proved to be quite effec
tive was to ask researchers to make personal presentations to
people in policy positions. During the height of the U.S.
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debate on the possible use of public service jobs in employ
ment and training programs, one of our researchers reported
to the Secretary of Labor on a study of the effect of public
service programs on unemployment in several European
countries. Another researcher discussed with an assistant
secretary the findings of a study of the employment prob
lems of black professional women in southern cities. A
Secretary of Labor heard a detailed report on the results of a
long term study of income assistance to ex-offenders. This
procedure effectively kept policymakers current with the
latest research findings.
Executive summaries of the results of research and
development projects relevant to their work or interest were
distributed regularly to policymakers in the Department of
Labor, executives in other federal agencies, senators and
representatives, and key staff members on the Hill. Interest
groups and leaders of public opinion in the public and
private sectors were sent selected research and development
reports. Monographs and reports were sent to the research
community. For example, Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J.
Piore's work on the dual labor market theory was published
as an ETA monograph and given wide distribution. In
recognition of the cumulative nature of social science
research, we published syntheses of several reports on the
same general subject area.
The products of the research office probably had their
greatest impact on legislation. We were able to directly trace
the findings of research studies on amendments to the
original Manpower Act. Reference to certain target groups
and concepts introduced in the CETA legislation can be trac
ed back to research and development findings. Our location
in the Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research gave us
easy access to staff members who were developing policy
statements or preparing legislation. They used our research
reports in developing new legislative proposals.
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As suggested earlier, it is almost impossible to determine
which research results help to shape policy decisions. Nor is
it possible to predict, in advance, what impact research find
ings will have on policy. The single research study funded by
the Office of Research and Development, which probably
had the greatest immediate and traceable impact on public
and private policy was a modestly funded study of the
reasons for the low level of black participation in appren
ticeship programs. 9
The findings of this study, which documented the reasons
why so few blacks were in apprenticeship and described the
methods used to bar their entry, resulted in a sharp and im
mediate redirection of the program of the Bureau of Appren
ticeship and Training and changed the apprenticeship selec
tion system of unions and employers. The results were used
by public agencies and private interest groups concerned
with equal employment opportunities. Based on this study,
the Department of Labor funded action programs designed
to assist minorities in entering apprenticeship programs. The
findings and their use in programs of this research project
were probably the primary reason for the large increase of
black participation in apprenticeship programs during the
1960s and 1970s.
Apparently, an unusual combination of factors con
tributed to the acceptance and immediate use of this study of
the apprenticeship system. The right questions were evident
ly asked at a time in history when there was a receptive au
dience of public and private policymakers who were willing
to act on the research findings. It coincided with a civil rights
movement that was seeking targets. No one could have
predicted in advance that this small research project would
have had such a far-reaching impact on policy. Certainly,
one cannot generalize about policy-oriented research based
on this and hundreds of other projects. The combination of
levels of funding, subjects studied, questions asked, the
receptivity of policymakers, timing and the temper of the
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times are not too helpful in anticipating the impact of
research on policy.
When the research program was 10 years old, the Depart
ment of Labor asked the National Academy of SciencesNational Research Council to establish a committee to
review, assess and make recommendations regarding the
manpower research and development program. Among the
topics covered by the committee was the " relevance of the
Department's R&D efforts to ... influence . . . the
development of national manpower and related policies and
programs. . . ." 10 After analyzing a sample of almost 1,000
projects funded by the Office of Research and Development
between 1963 and 1975, commissioning papers on specific
aspects of the ORD program and conducting 375 interviews,
the committee concluded that the "manpower R&D program
has made a number of outstanding contributions to
policy. . . ." n
The committee reported that ORD had been instrumental
in identifying and exploring the complexities of manpower
problems. It referred specifically to our work on job vacan
cies, projections of future manpower requirements, the
nature and extent of occupational training of the nation's
labor force, the spatial and occupational distribution of
unemployment and underemployment and the employment
experience of minority workers and the economically and
socially disadvantaged. Studies of labor market deficiencies,
including the adverse effects of occupational licensing,
employment discrimination and the development of new
theories to illuminate complexities of labor market opera
tions were also cited as examples of research and develop
ment projects influencing policy and programs. The commit
tee noted the realities of the research office's existence in an
operationally oriented federal department subject to fre
quent shifts in policy. As a result of the committee's inter
views, it found only scant acceptance among department of
ficials "of the need for comprehensive, extended efforts aim-
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ed at better understanding fundamental and persistent man
power problems." 12
To summarize our experience in policy-oriented research,
we would conclude that the design of a social science
research program which can be useful to policymakers in a
mission-oriented agency is probably the greatest challenge
faced by research administrators. The turnover of political
appointees, many of whom take government positions with
preconceived biases and special agendas, the general lack of
interest in long term research and frequent changes in
priorities and legislation all reduce the potential contribution
of social research to the policymaking process. In spite of
these difficulties, a research administrator must constantly
explore ways of bringing valid research findings to the atten
tion of decisionmakers.

Disappointments and Accomplishments
In reviewing 18 years of experience as an administrator of
a federal research and development program, I should like to
first comment on some of my disappointments. I fear that
little can be done about my negative conclusions.
Let me again start with the caveat that my comments on
political leadership apply to both political parties. The
Department of Labor was quite fortunate in being ad
ministered by political appointees between 1962 and 1980
who, for the most part, if not interested in social science
research at least tolerated it. Unfortunately, our political
system often brings appointees into the government who not
only know very little about the programs they are to ad
minister but who are unable to use social science research
findings in making policy decisions. Communicating the ob
jective results of research findings to some political ap
pointees was sometimes a futile exercise. I see little
likelihood in the foreseeable future that presidents will ever
make selections of political appointees on the basis of their
program knowledge or their ability to use research findings.
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My second major disappointment was with the social
science research community. Most of the social scientists
who applied for research funding to the Office of Research
and Development seemed to be unaware that they were ap
proaching a research organization in a mission-oriented
agency. Many of them never took the time to read the law
under which we operated.
Our graduate educational system seems to turn out too
many researchers who are concerned with methodology,
model building, and discipline-oriented research that is of lit
tle use to those concerned with the nation's economic and
social problems. Our educational system seems to destroy
whatever creativity or innovativeness students may have
before they become researchers. Too many social scientists
do not recognize that social research is cumulative and often
requires long term commitment on the part of the researcher.
Again, as with political appointees, I foresee little possibility
in the near future of improvement in the training of social
scientists. Graduate schools will continue to produce too
many narrow discipline-oriented researchers, most of whom
will have little interest in applying their research skills to real
world problems.
What did we accomplish in 18 years of the research and
development program?
In order to attempt to answer this question I refer to a
16-year compilation of research and development projects. 13
I was first struck by the enormous diversity of our interests.
Our projects covered almost every subject in the employment
and training field. Second, although we made considerable
investments in applied program research, we still managed to
support basic research. Third, we funded a large number of
assessment and evaluation projects which provided
policymakers with objective data on the effectiveness of
Department of Labor programs. If one wanted to get infor
mation to criticize DOL's work, one simply could turn to the
research findings of projects funded by a neutral, profes-
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sional social science research program conducted by a
federal agency. Fourth, the true meaning of cumulative
research became apparent in tracing projects that slowly
built on previous research findings. Our studies of illegal im
migrants, discrimination, occupational licensing, employ
ment problems of ex-offenders, barriers to employment and
other labor market operation projects were supported over
10-year periods. The continuity of support and the commit
ment of researchers to particular subject areas effectively
build a bank of information on important social and
economic problems. Fifth, our intensive concentration on
certain issues is certainly impressive. For example, our early
research predicted that important social and economic
developments were changing the work pattern and life style
of American women.
During the first 16 years of the program, some 128 pro
jects were funded to examine the work and employment
problems of women workers. The subjects studied ranged
from women in nontraditional blue-collar jobs, maternity
leave benefits, child care arrangements of working mothers,
labor force mobility of women, the effects of marriage and
divorce on labor force participation, fertility and career pat
terns, dual careers, minority women in white-collar jobs,
female heads of families, marital status and occupational
mobility of women, econometric analysis of the part-time
labor market for women and career patterns of women
physicians. These research studies combined with experimen
tal and developmental projects designed to break new
ground for women in the labor market can be considered a
major accomplishment of the program.
As noted earlier, our research and development work con
tributed to a broader understanding of the employment
problems of the economically disadvantaged of our society.
Exploratory studies of unemployment in the ghetto changed
the data collection system of BLS and the Census Bureau. A
series of studies of the employment problems of ex-offenders
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led to changes in questions on job application forms of state
and local government about arrest records. Much of our
work was translated into legislative amendments and the in
troduction of new concepts in legislation.
The development and continuing support of the National
Longitudinal Surveys has provided the country with new in
formation about the employment experience of our
workforce, the effect of health on work and retirement,
labor force participation of women, discrimination, at
titudes toward work and the result of inadequate labor
market knowledge on the earnings and careers of minority
youth. The longitudinal nature of these surveys has given us,
for the first time, predictive tools and a broader under
standing of how social and cultural changes affect work pat
terns.
Our efforts to improve the methodologies used to assess
social programs should provide more valid findings for the
use of policymakers. In my view, the emphasis we placed on
the use of random assignments, control groups, cost ac
counting, adequate samples and the professional manage
ment of experimental and demonstration projects con
tributed to the improvement of the state of art of experimen
tal and demonstration projects. We believe that the Sup
ported Work model established a landmark for future
research demonstration projects.
The grant and institutional support programs played a
central role in increasing the number and improving the
quality of researchers active in the field of employment and
training. Well over 500 recipients of grants completed their
doctorates. The institutional grant program, which funded
undergraduate study and self-directed faculty research
helped increase academically-based research centers.
One final reflection: the management of a program involv
ing thousands of projects and millions of dollars of federal
funds is obviously not a one-person job. The quality and ef
fectiveness of the research and development program
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depended on the small number of career servants who con
ducted the day-to-day operations of soliciting, developing
and reviewing proposals, handling the onerous details
associated with government contracts and grants, monitor
ing projects and planning utilization strategy. These
employees had to combine practical managerial skill with a
professional knowledge of the social sciences. Praising
government employees is not a popular pastime in
Washington in 1984. But I would be remiss if I did not pay
tribute to the professionalism, conscientiousness and dedica
tion of the federal employees who contributed to the success
of the Employment and Training Administration's research
and development program.
Washington is noted for the short term careers of political
appointees who leave few lasting reminders of their
ephemeral fame. In contrast, the civil servants who par
ticipated in ETA's research and development program can
rest assured that they have left a lasting legacy of knowledge
and information which has had and will continue to have an
impact on some of this country's most complex social and
economic problems.
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Policy Lessons
From Three
Labor Market Experiments
Gary Burtless
Robert H. Haveman
Social experimentation began in earnest when the New
Jersey negative income tax experiment was launched in 1967.
For the next 14 years, government agencies and philan
thropic organizations sponsored a wide variety of ex
periments and demonstrations involving innovations in
social policy; none were more important than those concern
ing the controversial income support-work issue. In this
paper we consider three of the most important social policy
experiments: the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Ex
periment, the National Supported Work Demonstration,
and the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project. These pro
jects have yielded findings of broad significance to social
policy, though the significance of their findings is only dimly
perceived by policymakers and interested scholars. Our pur
pose in this review is to briefly describe the experiments and
state the main policy conclusions that can be drawn from
them. In our final section, we will discuss some conclusions
about the effects and value of social experiments in general.
105
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The Seattle-Denver Experiment
The Seattle-Denver experiment was the largest and most
comprehensive of the Negative Income Tax (NIT) ex
periments. It was begun in Seattle in 1970 and in Denver in
1971 under contracts between the States of Washington and
Colorado and the U.S. Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare. The experiment was administered by
Mathematica, a research organization that had already gain
ed valuable administrative experience running the New
Jersey experiment. The Stanford Research Institute designed
the experiment and was given major responsibility for
evaluating it. There is no doubt that the Seattle-Denver ex
periment was the best run of the NIT experiments, and it was
the most thoroughly studied.
Approximately 4800 families were enrolled in the experi
ment, and families assigned to experimental NIT plans were
potentially eligible for payments for a period of either three
or five years. 1 To be eligible for enrollment, families had to
contain at least one ablebodied, nonaged adult. If only a
single adult was present, the family was also required to have
one or more dependent children. The sample enrolled in the
experiment consisted of lower- and middle-income black,
white, and Hispanic families with either one or two parents
present. While participation was restricted to residents of
Seattle and Denver, families could continue to participate if
they moved out of those cities.
The experiment had two main goals, both of which were
reflected in its rather elaborate design. The first was to deter
mine the effect of alternative NIT plans on the work
behavior of the poor. The second was to test the feasibility
and effectiveness of educational vouchers aimed at lowincome workers.
The idea behind a negative income tax is fairly well-known
and will not be discussed in detail here. In its simplest form,
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a NIT offers a guaranteed monthly or annual income to a
family that has no other income of its own. This amount
varies depending on the number of persons in the family and
was systematically varied in the experiment to measure the
impact of higher or lower income support levels. If a family
receives income from nonexperimental sources, such as wage
earnings, interest, or public transfers, the monthly NIT pay
ment is reduced in proportion to the amount of other income
received. As income from other sources rises, the NIT pay
ment is reduced by an amount determined by the program's
tax (or benefit reduction) rate. The tax rate was also
systematically varied in the experiment. When income from
other sources is sufficiently high that the benefit reduction
exactly offsets the income guarantee—at a point known as
the break-even—payments under a NIT cease. A NIT's
break-even level is algebraically determined by its guarantee
and tax rate. As the guarantee level rises, the break-even also
rises; as the tax rate rises, the break-even level declines.
Both theory and common sense suggest that the transfer
scheme just described will affect work effort. Those who
receive payments will have more income, so the necessity for
earned income falls. Because payments are reduced as earned
income rises, the reward for work is also affected. Under a
benefit reduction rate of 70 percent, for example, a recipient
who earns an additional dollar loses $0.70 in NIT benefits,
and the net increase in income is only $0.30. The SeattleDenver experiment tested 11 NIT plans with income
guarantees ranging from slightly below to about 40 percent
above the poverty threshold and tax rates ranging from
about 50 to 70 percent. With this range of tested guarantees
and tax rates, the designers hoped to detect the impact of a
meaningful array of plans. In retrospect, we can criticize the
designers for their conservative assessment of the meaningful
range of tax rates. The policy debate since 1977, and
especially since 1981, has shown that tax rates in excess of 90
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percent or even 100 percent are well within the policyrelevant range.
The random assignment of families or individuals to alter
native treatments—or no treatment at all—is what gives
social experimentation its unique advantage as a tool for
policy analysis. With only a few modest and believable
statistical assumptions, it is possible for the analyst of ex
perimental data to establish a definite cause-and-effect rela
tionship between treatment variations and observed out
comes. The direction and precise magnitude of the relation
ship can be established with known levels of statistical con
fidence. In the case of the Seattle-Denver experiment,
families were randomly assigned to 1 out of the 11 tested
NIT plans or to control status. A family enrolled in one of
the NIT plans was eligible to receive NIT grants if its income
was below the plan's break-even. A family in the control
group was not eligible to receive these experimental transfers
but could continue to receive any nonexperimental transfers
for which it remained eligible. The effect of the NIT plans on
work behavior can be reliably determined simply by
statistically comparing the work effort of individuals enroll
ed in the various plans and in the control group.
The work-effort findings from the Seattle-Denver experi
ment have been summarized in a final report recently issued
by the Department of Health and Human Services. Briefly,
the report shows that the tested NIT plans caused substantial
reductions in labor market activity, particularly for persons
enrolled in longer duration (5-year) plans and for women. By
"substantial" we mean that prime-aged men reduced their
annual hours of work by 9 or 10 percent; that their spouses
reduced annual hours by 17 to 20 percent; and that women
heading single-parent families reduced annual hours by more
than 20 percent—perhaps by as much as 28 to 32 percent. 2
These reported work reductions are large enough to cause
alarm among conservatives already opposed to a NIT and
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even among centrists with no strong opinions about the
desirability of a NIT.
Taken by themselves, however, the work reductions just
reported have almost nothing to tell us about the desirability
or feasibility of enacting a NIT. The work reductions appear
to be fairly substantial, but the work disincentive provided
by the tested plans was also quite substantial, larger in fact
than that which would be provided under most proposed
NIT plans. The Seattle-Denver plans tested an average in
come guarantee of 115 percent of the poverty threshold and
a marginal tax averaging only about 50 percent. In addition,
the experiment provided rebates for state, federal, and PICA
taxes on earned income. About 80 percent of enrolled
families faced a break-even level that was more than oneand-a-half times the poverty threshold, and 50 percent faced
a break-even more than twice the poverty level (that is, above
$19,600 for a family of four in 1982 dollars). By contrast, the
combined income guarantee provided by AFDC and food
stamps is now below the poverty level in most states, and the
break-even level for AFDC is below the poverty level in all
but 15 states. 3
Even so, the labor supply findings from Seattle-Denver
were considered sufficiently important to affect the welfare
reform proposals submitted by the Carter Administration. 4
The reason was quite simple. The results showed quite con
vincingly that the work incentive provided by a NIT's low
marginal tax rate was more than offset by the work disincen
tive effects caused by higher overall transfers. For example,
simulations based upon the Seattle-Denver results
demonstrated that replacement of the current welfare and
food stamp programs with a national NIT that has a
guarantee equal to three-quarters of the poverty line and a
marginal tax rate of 50 percent would reduce aggregate labor
supply in two-parent families by about 1 percent. Labor sup
ply in two-parent families with annual incomes below $5,000
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would be reduced by more than 8 percent. 3 Although we do
not find these estimates discouraging by themselves, they
contain an implication that is dispiriting to policymakers
who wish to simultaneously support incomes and increase
the self-reliance of needy families. According to the SeattleDenver estimates, under the NIT plan just described it would
cost the government $1.79 in transfer outlays to raise the net
income of poor two-parent families by $1.00. In other
words, 44 percent of the net program costs of the NIT would
be "consumed" by breadwinners in the form of leisure. (The
net program cost of the NIT is the amount by which NIT
transfers exceed those now paid under the welfare and food
stamp programs.)
Another important—though at first glance, per
verse—result from the experiment was that lowering work
incentives in transfer programs by raising their marginal tax
rates (holding the guarantee constant) serves to increase ag
gregate work effort. For example, if the tax rate in the NIT
just described were raised from 50 to 70 percent, the SeattleDenver results indicated that aggregate work effort would
rise by 1 percent. 6 The result is attributable to the fact that
while increases in marginal tax rates may indeed reduce the
work effort of continued transfer recipients, that effect is
more than outweighed by the increases in work effort that
occur among those who lose benefits altogether. (Recall that
a rise in the marginal tax rate with a constant guarantee
causes a fall in the break-even and hence a reduction in the
number of transfer recipients.)
If one's sole objective is to increase work effort, the recent
increases in AFDC tax rates might conceivably be justified
by findings of the Seattle-Denver experiment. 7 This conclu
sion, however, rests on the premise that the main objective
of transfer policy is to encourage work effort. In fact, the
primary objective of a NIT is to protect the living standards
of people who would otherwise be destitute, and to do so in
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an equitable and efficient way. The contribution of the NIT
program to this objective, it should be noted, has received
only slight attention in the hundreds of research reports filed
on the NIT experiments. This in spite of the fact that the
tested NIT plans were potentially quite effective in attaining
that goal. Nevertheless, the Seattle-Denver experiment has
played the useful role of overturning the notion, especially
popular among economists and idealistic reformers, that
lower marginal tax rates are automatically associated with a
greater stimulus to work.
The second objective of the experiment was to test the ef
fectiveness of issuing education and training vouchers to
low-income breadwinners. Families in the experiment were
randomly assigned to one of three employment-training pro
grams or to control status. 8 All three of the labor market
programs provided a structured course of manpower
counseling to help participants decide on an appropriate
strategy of employment, education, and training. This
course was voluntary, informational in content, and nondirective (that is, participants were not encouraged to pursue
any particular course of action). One of the tested programs
offered no service beyond this counseling. The other two of
fered subsidies to pay for some or all of the direct costs of
schooling or training.9 Two levels of voucher subsidy were
tested. In the more generous plan, 100 percent of direct
training costs were reimbursed by the experiment. In the
other plan, only 50 percent of costs were reimbursed. Par
ticipants could use their vouchers to pay for any education or
training they chose, so long as it was at least tangentially
related to improving their future job prospects.
The purpose of the vouchers was to encourage eligible
breadwinners to invest in worthwhile training and education,
which according to human capital theory should have im
proved participants' employability and future earnings. Par
ticipation in the program was reasonably high. About one-
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fifth of family heads in two-parent families used the 50 per
cent vouchers, and over one-third used the 100 percent
vouchers. About one-third of single mothers eligible for the
50 percent vouchers used them, as did nearly one-half of
those eligible for the 100 percent vouchers. Not surprisingly,
much of the subsidy went to pay for schooling that would
have been obtained in the absence of the program. Most of
the subsidies paid for attendance in formal academic pro
grams, such as those run by community colleges, rather than
for technical training. The more generous subsidy program
succeeded in encouraging extra investment in formal school
ing, with the rise averaging about one-half an academic
quarter among men eligible for the subsidies and about one
to one-and-one-half extra quarters among eligible women. 10
The interesting finding from this experiment is the com
plete lack of evidence that the increased investment in
schooling by participants led to any pay-off in the job
market. On the contrary, persons eligible for vouchers—in
comparison to control-group members—suffered short term
reductions in wage rates, earnings, and employment during
the initial phase of their eligibility. And they never showed
consistent earnings gains over the entire 6-year span for
which information is available, a period which includes a
fairly lengthy spell in which participants had completed their
schooling. 11 One explanation for this result is that the
vouchers induced significant short term reductions in work
effort and work intensity by subsidizing an alternative use of
time—enrollment in formal schooling. After the training was
completed, participants' earnings failed to rise above the
level observed in the control group because of the amount
and character of extra schooling obtained. The amount of
extra schooling was on average very small, and it was ap
parently not particularly relevant to the participants' labor
market situation. A second explanation concerns the effect
of a rather poor and generally deteriorating labor market on

Three Labor Market Experiments 113

the earnings potential of those who reduce (or cease) their
work in order to obtain additional schooling. In such a labor
market, the returns to work experience and job-keeping may
be in excess of those to increased schooling. It is difficult to
make training pay off if there are few jobs available.
Employment and training programs for the poor are
sometimes criticized for being too rigid, too bureaucratic,
too paternalistic, and too insensitive to the special needs of
different clients. The experimental test of manpower
vouchers in Seattle and Denver shows that completely decen
tralized decisionmaking, an approach often advocated by
economists, may not be an effective substitute for our pre
sent arrangements, at least in the face of low labor demand.
When given the resources and freedom to choose their own
training strategy, low-income breadwinners appear to be no
better at selecting a winning strategy than are the ad
ministrators and training specialists who now run training
and employment programs.

The National Supported Work Demonstration
The 1970's commitment to assist hard-to-employ workers
in finding jobs is perhaps best illustrated by the Supported
Work Program. The program was a research and demonstra
tion program, rather than a comprehensive employment pro
gram. It began in 1975 and was, from its inception, schedul
ed to last five years. Its basic objective was to provide in
dividuals who had severe employment problems with work
experience of about one year. The work experience was pro
vided under conditions of gradually increasing demands,
close supervision, and work in association with a crew of
peers. The guiding principle of the demonstration was that
"... by participating in the program, a significant number
of people who are severely handicapped for employment
may be able to join the labor force and do productive work,
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cease engaging in socially destructive or dependent behavior,
and become self-supporting members of society." 12
Four groups of employment-handicapped workers were
eligible for the program: female long term recipients of
AFDC, convicts recently released from prison, former drug
addicts, and young school dropouts who often had a delin
quency record. Fifteen sites were chosen for the program.
While each site was given responsibility for defining the type
of work on which it would focus and the source of local
funds on which it would draw, the entire program had a
common research-evaluation emphasis. Hence, a variety of
factors were standardized across the 15 sites. These included
the basic program design of low supervisor-participant
ratios, steadily increasing standards of attendance, punc
tuality, and productivity, crew work and peer group support,
and common eligibility criteria, wage rates, and employment
duration. Like the Seattle-Denver experiment, the Supported
Work Demonstration used a rigorous experimental design
involving the random assignment of applicants to ex
perimental (participant) and control (nonparticipant com
parison) groups. We can therefore place substantial con
fidence in the demonstration's findings.
Over its 5-year life, the demonstration provided services to
over 10,000 persons, although at any point in time the
number of participants at any site was limited to 300. The
evaluation of the demonstration was based on interviews
with 3,214 participants and 3,402 controls. Each person in
the research sample was interviewed prior to participation
and given up to four additional interviews at 9-month inter
vals.
The participants suffered severe employment handicaps.
Fewer than one-third had graduated from high school, most
were black or Hispanic, fewer than one-quarter were mar
ried, the number weeks worked in the year prior to enroll-
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ment averaged six or seven, and (except for the female
welfare group) arrest rates ranged from 54 to 100 percent.
The work provided varied across sites, but included home
rehabilitation, recapping tires, building furniture, and
operating day care centers. Some program outputs were sold
in the market in order to raise revenues for the program.
The program performance of the four enrolled groups
varied considerably. Supported Work proved most effective
in preparing the welfare women who had least work ex
perience for gainful employment. It also had a significant
impact on the ex-addict group. For the ex-offender group,
the results were marginal and not statistically significant,
while no long term positive results were found for the group
of young dropouts. Overall, the participants in the program
stayed an average of 6.7 months, even though the goal of the
demonstration was about 12 months of participation. Thirty
percent of the participants were fired because of poor perfor
mance; an equivalent number, however, moved on to fulltime regular jobs. (The successful transition rate improved
steadily over the course of the program.) About 10 percent
of the participants (25 percent of the long term welfare
women) had to be released after 12 months of participation,
because their maximum permissible program stay had been
attained. The average cost to the public per recipient was
$5,740, but because most participants stayed in the program
less than one year, the average cost per service year was over
$10,000. This cost declined steadily over the five years of the
demonstration and is about the same as the service-year cost
in another targeted training program, Job Corps.
The program had a variety of impacts on its participants in
areas ranging from drug use and criminal activity to employ
ment behavior and welfare dependency. The AFDC group
showed the most consistently positive response to the
demonstration. In this group, participation was associated
with increases in employment rate, hours worked, and earn-
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ings, both during and after the period of program participa
tion. In addition, there was a significant reduction in welfare
dependency as well as reduction in the average amount of
food stamps and other transfers received. The welfare
women helped most by Supported Work tended to be older
(between 36 and 44), to be less educated, to have been on
welfare for a longer period, and to have little or no prior
work experience. At least the last three of these effects would
have been difficult to predict prior to the program, and in
deed are somewhat surprising.
Among ex-addicts the demonstration raised employment
and reduced criminal activity, but failed to have a statistical
ly significant impact on drug use. The main impact on
criminal activity seems to have been concentrated in the first
18 months after enrollment in the demonstration. The
demonstration's effect on employment probably persisted
for longer than that. Ex-convicts in the demonstration do
not seem to have been helped as much as the two groups just
mentioned. The demonstration did not affect employment,
welfare dependence, drug use, or criminal activity after par
ticipation ended. Similarly, the youth enrollees were not
helped much, if at all, by the program. In this case, however,
the evaluators found evidence that the target group was
probably more employable than originally believed. At some
time during the period of the study, between 80 and 90 per
cent of youth dropouts in the control group held a job. This
level far exceeds the rate of the other three control groups
studied, indicating that the youth group was less disadvantaged than the other target groups enrolled.
The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation and
Mathematica conducted a very careful benefit-cost evalua
tion of the demonstration. They computed the benefits and
costs of the program from three different perspectives—that
of program participants, that of taxpayers, and that of socie
ty as a whole (participants and taxpayers). The social
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benefits include the output produced by workers in the pro
gram, increases in their post-program earnings, reductions in
criminal activities, and savings from reduced participation in
other public employment, training, or drug treatment pro
grams. The social costs include all program operating costs
(excluding transfer payments, however, because these are
simply a redistribution of income). The benefit-cost tabula
tions were based on extrapolations over the typical working
life of the participants, with benefits assumed to decay at a
rate of 50 percent every five years except among AFDC
mothers where no decay rate in benefits is assumed.
The benefit-cost analysis showed that the demonstration
had considerable net social payoff for the welfare mothers
enrolled, primarily due to the long term earnings gains
assumed and the value of the output from the demonstration
jobs. Benefits also exceeded costs for the ex-addicts, in large
part because of the reduction in socially destructive behavior
(i.e., crime) and the gains in employment and earnings. For
ex-convicts the results were less conclusive. The net benefit
of the program may have been positive or negative depend
ing on the assumptions used to value the benefits of the pro
gram. Not surprisingly in view of the estimated impact of the
demonstration on youths, the program's cost was found to
outweigh its benefits for the youth dropout group.
Because of the very specific nature of the treatment tested
in the Supported Work Demonstration, it is difficult to draw
broad policy conclusions from its results. The finding that
the Supported Work approach had its greatest payoff in the
case of AFDC mothers is consistent with a few other findings
from the last decade of research on training and employment
programs. Some of the studies of the Continuous
Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS) have also conclud
ed that disadvantaged women helped by CETA appear to ob
tain the greatest program benefit. Similarly, in the SeattleDenver experiment, the only group to show a positive impact
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from the counseling program (as distinct from the voucher
program) was the sample of unmarried women with
children. Also, as we shall see below, the Employment Op
portunity Pilot Project appeared to have a more consistently
and significantly positive effect on unmarried women than
on other groups served. It would thus appear that single
mothers are more susceptible to being helped by public train
ing and employment efforts than other groups of hard-toemploy workers.

The Employment Opportunity Pilot Project
The history of the Employment Opportunity Pilot Pro
ject—or EOPP—was a tumultuous one, marked by shifting
objectives and premature cancellation. It is said that we learn
from our mistakes. If this were true, EOPP should have been
one of the most richly informative demonstrations ever
undertaken. The project was begun by the Carter Ad
ministration in order to estimate participation rates and
potential effects of a guaranteed jobs program similar to that
proposed in Carter's welfare reform package. Alarmed by
the work effort reductions estimated in the Seattle-Denver
experiment, the Administration was determined to limit the
work disincentive effects of its welfare proposal by requiring
certain welfare recipients to accept public service employ
ment (PSE) if they were unable to obtain unsubsidized jobs.
The President's welfare reform efforts were twice rebuffed
by Congress, but his PSE proposals were treated more sym
pathetically. In 1978 Congress permitted the Department of
Labor to set up a 14-site pilot test of a guaranteed jobs pro
gram.
Even before the first EOPP enrollments took place in
1979, the basic objectives of the demonstration had already
been modified. This was due in part to the Administration's
evolving objectives in reforming welfare and GETA. In addi
tion to simply providing a test of the guaranteed jobs con-
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cept, which was expected to be very expensive, the architects
of EOPP also hoped to test new approaches to job finding
among the hard-core unemployed. If applicants for PSE
jobs could be required to participate in intensive and struc
tured programs of job finding, and if those programs turned
out to be successful, the "demand" for PSE job slots, and
hence the cost of PSE, could be limited.
At the time the demonstration began in 1979, its objective
was to determine whether a program that provided a com
bination of ". . . job search assistance and subsidized
employment and training could succeed in increasing the
employment and, hence, reducing the welfare dependence of
adults in low-income families with children. The program,
targeted primarily toward families that were receiving
AFDC, provided participants with intensive job search
assistance and support services, such as child care and
transportation assistance. Participants who were unsuc
cessful at finding an unsubsidized job after a'prescribed
period of active search were offered a subsidized job or
training." 13
When President Reagan took office in 1981, the goals of
the program, or at least the focus of the program evaluation,
shifted once again. The new Administration wished to
abolish public service jobs, not to pilot test a program that
guaranteed them. It emphatically signaled this goal by end
ing enrollments into EOPP's PSE jobs program, sharply
curtailing enrollment in other components of the EOPP pro
gram, and prematurely terminating the entire project in Oc
tober 1981, less than two-and-one-half years after operations
began in 1979. Mathematica, the prime research contractor
for the project, was directed to discover the impact, if any,
of EOPP's job search assistance program and to provide a
cost-benefit analysis of that program.
The implementation of EOPP and its evaluation were
seriously harmed by these shifts in program objective. The
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original research and implementation design of EOPP was
sensible for a pilot test of a guaranteed jobs program.
However, it was extremely deficient for evaluating alter
native approaches to job search assistance, the goal em
phasized in the final evaluation contract. The available con
trol group was ill-suited to examining job search assistance.
To evaluate a guaranteed jobs program it is necessary to con
duct saturation demonstrations under a variety of local labor
market conditions. By saturation demonstrations we mean
that the program had to be offered on an unlimited basis to
all income-eligible families in a particular community.
Saturation was required in order to determine participation
rates in a well-publicized program and, equally important, to
see whether such a program would seriously disrupt local
labor markets by driving down the available supply of labor
for unsubsidized employment. To see how local labor
market conditions were affected by EOPP, it was necessary
to obtain a basis for comparison. Mathematica and DOL of
ficials selected 14 comparison sites to be used as a "control
group" for the 14 pilot sites in the demonstration. (Because
"control sites" were selected, EOPP might arguably be call
ed an experiment rather than a demonstration project.
However, eligibility for treatment was not randomly assign
ed to individuals except in Dayton and Philadelphia, and
hence the project was probably closer to an ordinary
demonstration than to a formal social experiment.) This
strategy required massive amounts of household interview
ing in both pilot and comparison sites.
Only a small proportion of these household interviews
would have been needed for an adequate assessment of the
job search assistance program by itself. Moreover, the ex
perimental and control groups should have been randomly
selected from the eligible population in the pilot sites. In
deed, for testing job search assistance, an experimental
design involving at most a few thousand participants and
controls in selected labor market environments is all that
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would have been required. Neither saturation, nor multiple
control sites, nor massive interviewing would have been
necessary.
EOPP was adminstered by the state and local officials
(prime sponsors) responsible for administering local CETA
programs. The competence and commitment of local ad
ministrators thus varied considerably. The prime sponsors
were responsible for publicizing the availability of EOPP
services, identifying, recruiting, and determining the
technical eligibility of potential clients, providing support
services like child care for enrolled participants, establishing
and administering a structured program of job search
assistance, and providing public service jobs, work ex
perience slots, and classroom and on-the-job training oppor
tunities for clients unable to obtain unsubsidized employ
ment. The broad character of program responsibilities and
the potential for administrative discretion at each point are
noteworthy, and they threaten the reliability of evaluation
findings. We simply cannot be confident about the exact
nature of the treatment as delivered in the field.
EOPP tested self-directed job search methods that are
quite distinct from the job referral and job development
techniques usually used in the Employment Service or
CETA. Clients were taught effective methods of job search
and encouraged to follow a rigorous and structured routine
in looking for employment. People who could not find un
subsidized jobs in five to eight weeks were offered a subsidiz
ed employment or training position, which could last up to
one year before workers or trainees were recycled through
the job search assistance program. Workers in PSE jobs and
OJT training positions were paid regular wages, while those
in work experience or classroom training slots were given a
weekly training stipend.
To be eligible for EOPP job search assistance, applicants
had to be adult members of families that included one or
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more children and that either received AFDC or had income
below 70 percent of BLS's Lower Living Standard. To be
eligibile for subsidized employment or training, individuals
were required to complete the job search phase of the pro
gram without obtaining unsubsidized employment and, in
addition, be the family's primary earner and either receive
AFDC or have low enough income to qualify for AFDC. In
most sites the program was aimed primarily at adult AFDC
recipients.
Mathematica's evaluation of EOPP covers only 10 of the
14 communities involved in the demonstration. In those ten
communities it is estimated that over 190,000 adults were
eligible for EOPP services at some point during the
demonstration. 14 However, of that total only 120,000 were
eligible for the full range of EOPP services, including sub
sidized employment and training. Only 21,000—or 18
percent—of those fully eligible chose to enroll in EOPP. An
additional 2,000 adults eligible only for job search assistance
also enrolled in the program. 15 Of those individuals who fill
ed out the forms to enroll, only about 62 percent remained in
the program long enough to receive some job search
assistance. One-third of the people receiving job search help
obtained an unsubsidized job. Only 4,100—or 17 percent of
enrollees—remained with the program long enough to
receive subsidized employment or training, of which approx
imately two-thirds were assigned to PSE jobs. 16 Thus, of the
120,000 potential participants in EOPP's "guaranteed jobs"
program, fewer than 3 percent actually obtained PSE jobs.
The striking feature of these statistics is the very small pro
portion of program eligibles who actually received program
services, especially very expensive services like subsidized
jobs and training. This suggests that a guaranteed public
jobs program aimed at the welfare-eligible poor would be
considerably less expensive than anticipated by the Carter
Administration, which expected a much higher participation
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rate. On the other hand, the program would also be much
less successful than expected in reducing welfare
dependence, since only a small percentage of AFDC reci
pients would apparently be forced to participate in such a
program. 17 In part the low participation rate in the jobs pro
gram was attributable to uncertain guidelines from the
Labor Department, poor program administration at the
local level, normal start-up problems, and a lack of publicity
for the program. Even with these problems it was
astonishing to program operators that so small a proportion
of obviously eligible people chose to enroll. Among AFDC
recipients who were mandatory participants in the WIN pro
gram (and thus likely to be ready to hold a job), only onethird enrolled in EOPP, and the availability of EOPP was
widely advertised among that group. 18 Among nonrecipients
of AFDC who were eligible for EOPP PSE jobs, only 8 per
cent enrolled in the EOPP program. 19
In view of the apparently generous offer provided by the
program, this studied indifference to EOPP is interesting. Of
course, it is possible to keep enthusiasm for public jobs down
by erecting enough bureaucratic hurdles—a complex and
lengthy application process, mandatory participation in a
job search program, and potentially lengthy delays before
assignment to a PSE job. Nonetheless, it appears that the at
tractiveness of a temporary PSE job paying between one and
two times the minimum wage is not nearly as great as
sometimes assumed. Even though EOPP provided a highly
imperfect test, the administration of the demonstration was
probably not perceptibly inferior to what would be provided
in an on-going program. The local administrators of the pro
gram were after all the same people responsible for ad
ministering CETA and are probably now running training
and referral programs under JTPA. If there is any future
consideration of a guaranteed jobs program for welfare reci
pients, EOPP has taught us that both the costs and benefits
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will be considerably below what was expected in the
mid-1970s.
What of the other objectives of the project? The evalua
tion contractor concluded that the job search assistance pro
gram run by EOPP was probably effective in helping par
ticipants find jobs. Enrollees in the job search assistance pro
gram increased the amount and effectiveness of their search
efforts. In comparison to unemployed workers in the target
population who did not enroll in EOPP, participants spent
nearly twice as many hours a week searching for a job, con
tacted about four times as many potential employers, and fil
ed approximately 75 percent more formal job applications. 20
As mentioned earlier, about one-third of enrollees receiving
job search help landed an unsubsidized job. Although it is
unclear how much of an improvement is indicated by this
placement rate, Mathematica concluded that for the largest
group of enrollees—single mothers—EOPP probably raised
the employment rate by 10 to 12 percentage points and raised
the probability of unsubsidized employment by 7 to 9
percentage points. 21
Because EOPP was so poorly designed to measure the ef
fectiveness of job search assistance, Mathematica could not
determine the fraction of the employment gain that was due
solely to the job search plans tested. Nor were the researchers
able to reliably measure the impact of EOPP on the other
groups served—married women and men with dependent
children. Mathematica could detect no impact of the pro
gram on welfare dependency, a surprising finding in view of
the population served by EOPP, which consisted over
whelmingly of public assistance recipients. Because EOPP
and its evaluation were terminated with unseemly haste in
1981, we will never know whether the employment gains
registered by EOPP participants were temporary or longlasting. Nor can we ascertain whether welfare dependency
was eventually affected by the program. Because of the
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limitations described above, Mathematica was unable to per
form a benefit-cost analysis of the job search program alone,
although the analysts did conclude that the EOPP project's
overall social benefits probably exceeded its social costs.
Based on our reading of the evidence, it appears that a
modest and comparatively inexpensive program to help lowincome breadwinners search for work may reduce spells of
unemployment and raise the fraction of time spent working.
Even though it is doubtful that this kind of help will change
many workers' lives or radically change the nature of jobs
they obtain, the help is nonetheless worthwhile, and it comes
at relatively low cost.
Before concluding this discussion of EOPP, we should
also note that some of the pilot sites tested variants of the
basic self-directed job search model. One of the most in
teresting variants was tested in Dayton, Ohio where wagesubsidy vouchers were distributed to a randomly selected
subgroup of enrollees in the job search classes. The vouchers
were simply certificates provided to participants to help them
in their search for work. Participants were encouraged to
alert potential employers of their vouchered status. If a
vouchered job seeker was hired by a qualified employer, the
employer could claim a subsidy for a fraction of the wages
paid to the newly hired worker. The subsidy was payable
either in the form of a tax credit or a direct check payment to
the employer. It was worth up to $4,500 over a 2-year period.
In effect, the vouchered workers were "on sale."
Employers, however, appeared to regard these workers as
damaged goods. In comparison to unvouchered participants
in the EOPP program, vouchered job seekers were
significantly less likely to obtain employment during their 5or 8-week job search period. Although this experiment is
limited in many ways, and the research on it was discon
tinued too early to be definitive, the findings are intriguing.
The basic result appears to show that a targeted wage
voucher may hurt rather than help a job seeker's chances of
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employment. It should thus come as no surprise that our na
tion's two most important wage subsidy programs—the
WIN and Targeted Jobs tax credits—are so little used.
Because the stigma associated with these programs may
outweigh their tax advantages to employers, the unemployed
may be reluctant to use them and employers may be less like
ly to hire job seekers who offer them.

A Moral and Some Lessons
Social experiments have primarily been tools of social
scientists seeking guidance for effective policy reform or in
novation, but their conclusions have often been very
pessimistic for those wishing to change public policy. Ac
cording to the Foreword of the New Jersey Income
Maintenance Experiment final report, the decision to under
take that experiment was based on the ". . . rapid spread of
the belief, especially among economists, that negative in
come taxation was an idea whose time had come." 22 After
the New Jersey Experiment began, two Presidents—Nixon
and Carter—proposed variants of a federal negative income
tax, but in neither case was the cause of the proposal advanc
ed by findings from the experiments. In fact, the high price
tag of the proposed Carter plan, which certainly harmed its
chances of enactment, was estimated using interim results
from the Seattle-Denver experiment.
Because of the rigor with which experiments are designed
and evaluated there may be a bias toward reaching
pessimistic conclusions about policies that are experimental
ly tested. The tested program is subject to critical examina
tion of a type that is rarely imposed on existing programs.
Such an examination is likely to reveal undesirable or even
pernicious side-effects of a policy that might not otherwise
be detected. Consider, for example, the earned income tax
credit. Under this apparently benign provision of the tax
code, refundable tax credits are provided to low-wage
workers who have dependents. The purpose of the credit is
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to encourage work effort. If this policy were systematically
evaluated using the methods applied to social experiments,
the credit might be shown to reduce work effort or en
courage family dissolution as the NIT was found to do. In
deed, the credit increases work disincentives because it in
creases marginal tax rates for more workers than are eligible
for a subsidy on marginal work. If these effects were found
to occur, and if they were widely publicized, the credit could
be politically doomed. However, such effects are unlikely to
be investigated because of the program's uncontroversial
nature.
Numerous other examples could be mentioned. Do sub
sidized student loans stimulate increases in education? If
they do, is the added investment in education worth its social
and private cost? Do business tax reductions and other statelocal subsidy programs to attract new business achieve their
goals? Such programs could conceivably reduce or delay
local investment projects if businesses delayed their decisions
as a result of their efforts to attract subsidy support.
If an experimentally tested program fails to achieve its in
tended purpose, or if it has disagreeable consequences, those
facts can be demonstrated with statistical rigor. Even more
disturbing, if the program fails to achieve spectacular
positive results, the degree to which it falls short of perfec
tion can be measured precisely and then used as an argument
against its implementation. If on the other hand an on-going
program does not achieve its objectives or does harm, its
failure may remain unsuspected, or at least unproved.
As an empirical fact, politically divisive policies are the
ones most likely to be subject to rigorous experimenta
tion—negative income taxation, housing vouchers for the
poor, national health insurance, and labor market assistance
to low-income workers. Programs aiding the able-bodied
poor are among those with the weakest popular mandate,
and hence their reform will nearly always inspire deep con-
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troversy. It is unclear whether experimentation per se can
shed much light on the main points at issue—the demands of
equity, the nature of a fair distribution, and the limit of
society's obligation to help those who are at least partly able
to help themselves. Our experience in the last fifteen years
has taught us that large-scale social experiments can be relied
on to teach us something of value about the policy in ques
tion, but what we are taught can seldom be relied on to aid
the cause of reforming or improving policy. Since society is
not even-handed in subjecting programs for the poor and
nonpoor to experimental investigation, we should not be sur
prised that experimental scrutiny has been less than kind to
programs for the poor. There is a moral here, and it is il
lustrated in the three experiments we have considered: if you
advocate a particular policy reform or innovation, do not
press to have it tested.
Beyond this political economy moral, are there lessons for
research or evaluation that can be gleaned from the ex
periments? One such lesson concerns the costs and benefits
of large-scale social experimentation relative to nonexperimental social research. Clearly, the research costs of
social experimentation are enormous. For the three ex
periments reviewed here, the costs of program administra
tion (including experimental transfers, stipends, and wages)
and evaluation exceeded $200 million. The potential benefits
in terms of additions to knowledge may also be substantial,
especially when it is recognized that obtaining reliable infor
mation about human behavior is usually a slow process.
However, if the opportunity cost of any proposed experi
ment is a reduction in nonexperimental research costing the
same amount of money, the expected findings would have to
be extremely valuable for the benefits of an experiment to ex
ceed its cost. Of course, this conclusion is weaker if the op
portunity cost of the resources used for experimentation is
low. This would be the case, for example, for resources that
are diverted from some activity with low social value.
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In view of the high cost of experiments, it is appropriate to
subject proposals for future experiments to a test that in
cludes the following questions:
1. Have adequate models of the behavior which the ex
perimental treatment is designed to affect been
developed and tested on existing bodies of data?
2. Can the experiment and its evaluation meet high stan
dards of basic research? That is, can problems of time
horizon, contamination, Hawthorne effects, replicability, and extrapolation of results to a national program be
handled adequately in the experimental design or in the
evaluation of experimental results?
3. Can the experiment provide evidence about a social
policy that cannot be obtained using less expensive,
nonexperimental methods? Alternatively, can the ex
periment provide findings that are sufficiently more
reliable or statistically precise to justify the added cost
of the research?
4. How important are the potential research findings
about experimental outcomes? Are they crucial in deter
mining whether the tested treatment is a good or bad
policy?
5. Can the experiment permit tests and evaluation of the
operational feasibility of social policy measures and
yield evidence on the effectiveness of alternative ad
ministrative arrangements of such programs?
6. Can the experimental findings be validly generalized to
infer the consequences of policies not specifically tested
in the experiment?
The number of potential social experiments that can pass
the test implied by these questions is not likely to be large.
This conclusion is strengthened by our review of the findings
of the three experiments. While the evidence on behavioral
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responses is more reliable than is likely to be obtained from
nonexperimental research, its value, in terms of added
knowledge per dollar of cost, was not uniquely high except in
the case of the tested NIT plans. For the training and
employment experiments, including the one run as part of
the Seattle-Denver experiment, the programs tested were so
specific in nature that it is difficult to extrapolate the find
ings except to other programs that are run exactly as they
were. (For EOPP, even this may be impossible because the
tested treatments are essentially nonreplicable.)
The NIT experiment was more valuable for two reasons.
Its findings were considerably more reliable and statistically
precise than any that had been obtained in the preceding 10
years of nonexperimental research. Moreover, its findings
are useful in evaluating tax and welfare policies in addition
to those actually tested in Seattle-Denver, in part because
there is a well-developed theory for assessing labor supply
responses to tax rates and guarantees.
But the exception represented by the Seattle-Denver ex
periment is rare. Many conceivable experiments in the field
of employment and training must concentrate on testing
"black box" treatments. Supported Work and the job club
model tested in EOPP both represent this kind of treatment.
There is no well-established theory, as existed in the case of
the NIT experiments, that permits us to predict whether and
how these particular approaches will affect participants. Nor
can we predict from experimental findings the effect of
similar—but not identical—policy options. This lack of
knowledge regarding the process by which treatment affects
performance limits the applicability of the findings. In the
case of both Supported Work and EOPP, the treatment
tested was of little interest by the time the research was com
pleted, and the findings, in turn, were of limited value in
assessing policy options then being considered.
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Black box experiments can be valuable in employment and
training research if they are relatively inexpensive but
rigorous and if there is systematic variation in the treatments
which are tested. Investing large sums of money to test a
single approach is likely to be a serious error except under
very unusual conditions. To justify its high cost, a social ex
periment must offer the prospect of valuable additions to
knowledge about human behavior. In light of the moral
mentioned above, the benefits of an experiment will seldom
include basic reforms to policy.

NOTES
1. A very small number of families were enrolled in experimental plans
lasting up to 20 years.
2. Office of Income Security Policy, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Overview of the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance
Experiment Final Report, Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC, 1983, pp. 13-16. The higher estimate of the impact on women
heading single-parent families is based on the responses of women in the
5-year group during the fourth and fifth experimental years. Remaining
estimates are based on reported responses of enrollees in both the 3- and
5-year groups during the second and third experimental years.
3. Ibid., p. 6.
4. See Henry Aaron and John Todd, "The Use of Income Maintenance
Experiment Findings in Public Policy, 1977-78." Industrial Relations
Research Association Proceedings, 1979, pp. 46-56.
5. Implementing a NIT program for single-parent families, given the
combination of existing transfer programs, is difficult. Because of the
widely varying AFDC benefit levels across states, it is difficult to select a
NIT guarantee level that is low enough to be affordable, but high enough
so that only a small fraction of families in the high-benefit states receive
a NIT payment that is no lower than their current benefit. A national
NIT plan with a guarantee equal to three-quarters of the poverty line
would increase labor supply among single mothers, not because of the
work incentive embodied in a low tax rate, but because transfer benefits
would be slashed for so many mothers in states currently paying high
benefits.
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Response," in Final Report of the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance
Experiment, vol. I, Design and Results, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Government Printing Office, pp. 180-87.
7. Strictly speaking, the experiment provided no evidence about the im
pact of raising marginal tax rates to 100 percent. Within the range of tax
rates tested in the experiment, however, higher tax rates appear to be
associated with higher aggregate labor supply. See Ibid., p. 182.
8. Assignments to the employment-training programs were conducted in
such a way that analysts were able to reliably distinguish the separate im
pacts of those programs and the tested NIT plans.
9. Reimbursable (or direct) expenses included costs for tuition, books,
transportation, and child care.
10. Note that this was the impact on program eligibles; the impact on
program participants was of course much greater. The 50 percent subsidy
also encouraged some extra schooling, but the increases were smaller.
See Bureau of Social Science Research, Vouchering Manpower Services:
Past Experiences and Their Implications for Future Programs, Bureau of
Social Science Research report to the National Commission on Employ
ment Policy, Washington, DC, 1982, p. 20.
11. Ibid., p. 29.
12. This quote as well as much of the material for this section is drawn
from Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, Summary and
the Findings of the National Supported Work Demonstration, Ballinger
Publishing Co., Cambridge, MA, 1980.
13. Mathematica Policy Research, Final Report: Employment Oppor
tunity Pilot Project: Analysis of Program Impacts, MPR, Princeton,
NJ, p. 1.
14. Ibid., p. 20.
15. Ibid., p. 22.
16. Ibid., pp. 27, 105 and 116.
17. We should emphasize that the low participation of welfare recipients
in the demonstration was partly attributable to poor enforcement of job
search requirements in local welfare departments. If the job search/PSE
jobs and welfare programs were more tightly coordinated, the costs and
hence potential benefits of an EOPP-type program might have been
greater.
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18. Mathematica Policy Research, Final Report, p. 22. Many mandatory
participants in WIN are in fact required to participate in an activity like
EOPP as a condition for continued receipt of welfare benefits.
19. Ibid., p. 22.
20. Ibid., p. 108.
21. Ibid., p. 3. A small percentage of enrollees obtained employment in
EOPP's own jobs program. For that reason the gains in unsubsidized
employment were smaller than those in all forms of employment.
22. David Kershaw and Jerilyn Fair, The New Jersey Income
Maintenance Experiment, Volume I, Operations, Surveys, and Ad
ministration, Academic Press, New York, 1976, p. xi.
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